Quintilian,  Institutes of Oratory

Translated by H.E. Butler  (1920)

 

Book XII.1-3

The Rhetor as "Good Man Speaking Well"

 

     
Quintilian:  The Rhetor as Good Man   I.  The orator then, whom I am   concerned to form, shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato, "a good man, skilled in speaking."  But above all he must possess the quality which Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things the greatest and most important, that is, he must be a good man.  This is essential not merely on account of the fact that, if essential not merely on account of the fact that, if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend and arms to crime, there can be nothing more pernicious than eloquence to public and private welfare alike, while I myself, who have labored to the best of my ability to contribute something of value to oratory, shall have rendered the worst of services to mankind, if I forge these weapons not for a soldier, but for a robber.  But why speak of myself?  Nature herself will have proved not a mother, but a stepmother with regard to what we deem her greatest gift to man, the gift that distinguishes us from other living things, if she devised the power of speech to be the accomplice of crime, the foe to innocence and the enemy of truth.  For it had been better for men to be born dumb and devoid of reason than to turn the gifts of providence to their mutual destruction.  But this conviction of mine goes further.  For I do not merely assert that the ideal orator should be a good man, but I affirm that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man.  For it is impossible to regard those men as gifted with intelligence who on being offered the choice between the two paths of virtue and of vice choose the latter, nor can we allow them prudence, when by the unforeseen issue of their own actions they render themselves liable not merely to the heaviest penalties of the laws, but to the inevitable torment of an evil conscience.  But if the view that a vide man is necessarily a fool is not merely held by philosophers, but is the universal belief of ordinary men, the fool will most assuredly never become an orator.  To the must be added the fact that the mind will not find leisure even for the study of the noblest of tasks, unless it first be free from vice.  The reasons for this are, first, that vileness and virtue cannot jointly inhabit in the selfsame heart and that it is an impossible for one and the same mind to harbor good and evil thoughts as it is for one man to be at once both good and evil:  and secondly, that if the intelligence is to be concentrated on such  as vast subject as eloquence it must be free from all other distractions, among which must be included even those distractions, among which must be included even those preoccupations which are free from blame.  For it is only when it is free and self-possessed, with nothing to divert it or lure it else where, that it will fix its attention solely on that goal. that attainment of which is the object of its preparations.  If on the other hand inordinate care for the development of our estates, excess of anxiety over household affairs, passionate devotion to hunting or the sacrifice of whole days to the shows of the theatre, rob our studies of  the time that is their due (for every moment that is given to other that is their due (for ever moment that is given to other things involves a loss of time for study), what, think you, will be the results of desire, avarice, and envy, which waken such violent thoughts within out souls that they disturb our very slumbers and our dreams?  There is nothing so preoccupied, so distracted, so rent and torn by so many and such varied passions as an evil mind.  For when it cherishes some dark design, it is tormented with hope care and anguish of spirit, and even when it has accomplished its criminal purpose, it is racked by anxiety, remorse and the fear of all manner of punishments.  Amid such passions as these what room is there for literature or any virtuous pursuit?  You might as well look for fruit in land that is choked with thorns and brambles.  Well them, I ask you, is not simplicity of life essential if e are to be able to endure the toiled entailed by study?  What can we hope to get from lust or luxury?  Is not the desire to win praise one of the strongest stimulant to a passion for literature?  But does that mean that we  are to suppose that praise is an object of concern to bad men?  Surely every one of my readers must be now have realized  that oratory  is in the main condemned with the treatment of what is just and  honorable?  Can a bad and unjust man speak on such themes as the dignity of the subject demands?  Nay, even if we exclude the most important  aspects of the question now before us, and make the impossible concession that he has and worst of men may have the same talent, industry and learning, we are still confronted by the question as to which of the tow is entitled to be called the better orator.  The answer is surely clear enough:  it will be he who is he better man.  Consequently, the bad man and the perfect orator can never be identical.  For nothing is perfect, if there exists something else that is better.  However, as I do not wish to appear to adopt the practice dear to the Socratics  of framing answers to my own questions, let me assume the existence of a man so obstinately blind to the truth as to venture to maintain that a bad man equipped with the same talents, industry and learning will be not a whit inferior to the good man equipped with the same talents, industry and learning will be not a wit inferior to the good man as an orator; and let me show that he too is mad.  There is one point at any rate which no one will question, namely, that the aim of every speech is to convince the judge that the case which will do this best, the good man or the bad?  The good man will without doubt more often as what is true and honorable.  But even supposing that his duty should, as I shall show may sometimes happen, lead him to make statements which are false, his words are still certain to carry greater weight with his audience.  On the other hand bad men, in their contempt for pubic opinion and their ignorance of what is right, sometimes drop their mast unawares, and are impudent in the statement of their case and shameless in their assertions.  Further, in their attempt to achieve the impossible they display an unseemly persistency and unavailing energy.  For in lawsuits no less than in ordinary paths of life, they cherish depraved expectations.  But it often happens that even when they tell he truth they fail to win belief, and the mere fact that such a man is its advocate is regarded as an indication of the badness of the case.    
     
Objections to this Definition

 

 

 

 

 

Quintilian's Response

   I must now proceed to deal with the objections which common opinion is practically unanimous in bringing against this view.  Was not Remoistens an orator?  And yet we are told that he was a bad man.  Was not Cicero an orator?   And yet there are many who have found fault with his character as well.  What am I to answer?  My reply will be highly unpopular and I  must first attempt to conciliate my audience.  I do not consider that Remoistens deserves the serious relaxations that have been made upon his character to such an extent that I am bound to believe al the charges amassed against him by his enemies; for my reading tells me that this public policy was of the noblest and his end most glorious.  Again, I cannot see that the aims of Cicero were in any portion of is career other than such as may become an excellent citizen.  As evidence I would cite the fact that his behavior as consul was magnificent and his administration of his province a model of integrity, while he refused to become one o the twenty commissioners, and in the grievous civil wars which afflicted his generation beyond all others, neither hope nor fear ever deterred him from giving his support to the better party, that is to say, to the interest of the common weal.  Some, it is true, regard him as lacking in courage.  The best answer to these critics is to be found in his own words, to the effect that h was timid not in confronting peril, but in anticipating it.  And this he proved also by the manner of his death, in meeting which he displayed a singular fortitude.  But even if these two men lacked the perfection of virtue, I will reply to those who ask if they were orators, in the manner in which the Stoics would reply, if asked whether Zeno, Clianthus or Chrysippus himself were wise men.  I shall say that they did not attain to that which is the highest perfection of man's nature.  For did not Pythagoras desire that he should not be called a wise man, like the sages who preceded him, but rather a student of wisdom?  But for my own part, conforming to the language of every day, I have said time and again, and shall continue to say, that Cicero was a perfect orator, just as in ordinary speech we call our friends good and sensible men, although neither of these titles can really be given to any save to him that has attained to perfect wisdom.  But if I am called upon to speak strictly and in accordance with the most rigid laws of truth, I shall proclaim that I seek to find that same perfect orator whom Cicero also sought to discover.  For while I admit that he stood on the loftiest pinnacle of eloquence, and can discover scarcely a single deficiency in him, although I might perhaps discover certain superfluities which I think he would have pruned away (for the general view of the learned is that he possessed many  virtues and a few faults, and he himself states that he has succeeded in suppressing much of his youthful exuberance), non the less, in view of the fact that, although he had by no means a low opinion of himself, he never claimed to be the perfect sage, and, had he been granted longer life and less troubled conditions for the composition of his works, would doubtless have spoken better still, I shall not lay myself open to the charge of ungenerous criticism, if I say that I believe that he failed actually to achieve that perfection to the attainment of which non have approached more nearly, and indeed had defended my point with greater boldness and freedom.  Marcus Antonius declared that he had seen no man who was genuinely eloquent (and to be eloquent is a far less achievement than to be an orator), while Cicero himself has failed to find his orator in actual life and merely imagines and strives depict the ideal.  Shall that is yet to be, something more perfect may be found than has yet existed?  I say nothing of those critics who will not allow sufficient credit even for eloquence to Cicero and Demosthenes, although Cicero himself does not regard Demosthenes as flawless, but asserts that he sometimes nods, while even Cicero fails to satisfy Brutus and Calvus (at any rate they criticized his style to his face), or to win the complete approval of either of the Asinii, who is various passages attack the faults of his oratory in language which is positively hostile.    
     
Further Replies to theses Objections  

However, let us fly in the face of nature and assume that a bad man has been discovered who is endowed with the highest eloquence.  I shall none the less deny that he is an orator.  For I should not allow that every man who has shown himself ready with his hands was necessarily a brave man, because true courage cannot be conceived of without the accompaniment of virtue.  Surely the advocate who is called to defend the accused requires to be a man of honor, honor which greed cannot corrupt, influence seduce, or fear dismay.  Shall we then dignify the traitor, the deserter, the turncoat with the sacred name of orator?  But if the quality which is usually termed goodness is to be found even in quite ordinary advocates, why should not the orator, who has not yet existed, but may still be born, be no less perfect in character than in excellence of speech?  It is no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader, nor yet, to use no harsher term, a serviceable attorney of the class generally known as causidici, that I am seeking to form, but rather a man who to extraordinary natural gifts has added a thorough mastery of all the fairest branches of knowledge, a man send by heaven to be the blessing if mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and speech.  How small a portion of all these ablities will be required for the defense of the innocent, the repression of crime or the support of truth against falsehood in suits involving questions of money? It is true that our supreme orator will hear his part in such tasks, but his powers will be displayed with brighter splendor in greater matters than these, when he is called upon to direct the counsels of the senate and guide the people from the paths of error to better things.  Was not his the man conceived by Virgil and described as quelling a riot when torches and stones have begun to fly:

"Then, if before their eyes some statesman grave Stand forth, with virtue and high service crowned, Straight are they dumb and stand intent to hear."

Here then we have one who is before all else a good man, and it is only after this that the poet adds that he is skilled in speaking:

"His words their minds control, their passions soothe."

Again, will not this same man, whom we are staving to form, if in time of war he be called upon to inspire his soldiers with courage for the fray, draw for his eloquence on the innermost precepts of philosophy?  For how can men who stand upon the verge of battle banish all the crowding fears of hardship, pain and death from there minds, unless those fears be replaced by the sense of the duty that they owe their country, by courage and the lively image of a soldier's honor?  And assuredly the man who will best inspire such feelings in others is he who has first inspired them in himself.  For however we strive to conceal it, insincerity will always betray eloquence as would not begin to stumble and hesitate so soon as his words ran counter to this inmost thoughts.  Now a bad man cannot help speaking things other than he feels.  On the other hand, the good will never be at a loss for honorable words or fails to find matter full of virtue of utterance, since among his virtues practical wisdom will be one.  And even though his imagination lacks artifice to lend it charm, its own mature will be ornament enough, for if honor dictate the words, we shall find eloquence there as well.  Therefore, let those that are young, or rather let all of us, whatever our age, since it is never too late to resolve to follow what is right, stride with all our hearts and devote all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to our hearts and devote all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to us to attain to the perfection that we seek.  For since nature does not forbid the attainment of either, why should not someone succeed in attaining both together?  And why should not each of us hope to be that happy man?  But if our powers are inadequate to such achievement, we shall be the better for the double effort in proportion to the distance which we have advanced toward either goal.  At any rate let us banish from our hearts the delusion that eloquence, the fairest of all things, can be combined with vice.  The power of speaking is even to be accounted an evil when it is found in evil men; for it makes its possessors yet worse than they were before.  

 
     
The Role of Eloquence in Rhetoric   I think I hear certain persons (for there will always be some who had rather be eloquent than good) asking, "Why then is there so much art in connation with eloquence?  Why have you talked so much of 'glosses, the methods of defense to be employed in difficult cases, and sometimes even of actual confession of guilt, unless it is the case that the power and force of speech at times triumphs over truth itself?  For a good man will only plead good cases, and those might safely be left to truth to support without the aid of learning."  Now, though my reply to these critics will in the fist place be a defense of my own work, it will also explain what I consider to be the duty of a good man on occasions when circumstances have caused him to under take the defense of the guilty.  For it is by no means useless to consider how at times we should speak in defense of falsehood or even of injustice, if only for this reason, that such an investigation will enable us to detect and defeat them with the greater ease, just as the physician who has a thorough knowledge of all that can injure the health will be all the more skilful in the prescription of remedies.  For the Academicians, although they will argue on either side of a question, do not thereby commit themselves to taking one of these two views as their guide in life to the exclusion of the other, while the famous Carneades, who is said to have spoken at Rome in the presence of Cato the Censor, and to have argued against justice with no less vigor than he had argued for justice on the preceding day, was not himself an unjust man.  But the nature of virtue is revealed by vice, its opposite, justice becomes yet more manifest from the contemplation of injustice, and there are may other things hat are proved by their contraries.  Consequently the schemes of his adversaries should be no les well known to the orator than those of the enemy to a commander in the field.  But it is even true, although at first sight it seems hard to believe, that there may be sound reason why at at times  a good man who is appearing for the defence should attempt to conceal the truth from the judge.  If any of my readers is surprised at my making such a statement (although this opinion is not of my own invention, but is derived from those whom antiquity regarded as the greatest teachers of wisdom), I would have him reflect that there are many things which are made honourable or the reverse not by the nature of the facts, but by the causes from which they spring.  For if to slay a man is often a virtue and to put one's own children to death is at times the noblest of deeds, and if it is permissible in the public interest to do deeds yet more horrible to relate than these, we should assuredly take into consideration not solely and simply what is the nature of the case which the good man undertakes told defend, but what is this reason and what his purpose in so doing. And first of all everyone must allow, what even the sternest of the Stoics admit, that he good man will sometimes tell a lie, and further that he will sometimes do so for comparatively trivial reasons; for example we tell countless lies to sick children for their good and make many promises to them whichever do not intent to perform.  And there is clearly far more justification for lying when it is a question of diverting an assassin from his victim or deceiving an enemy to save our country.  Consequently a practice which is at times reprehensible even in slaves, may on other occasions be  praiseworthy even in a wise man.  If his be granted, I can see that there will be many possible emergencies such as to justify an orator in undertaking cases of a kind which, in the absence of any honorable reason, he would have refused to touch.  In saying this I do not mean that we should be ready under any circumstances to defend our father, brother or friend when in peril (since I hold that we should be guided by stricter rules in such matters), although such contingencies may well cause us no little perplexity, when we have to decide between the rival claims of justice and natural affection.  But let us put the problem beyond all question of doubt.  Suppose a man to have plotted against a tyrant and to be accused of having done so.  Which of the two will of orator, as defined by us, desire to save?  And if he undertakes the defense of the accused, will he not employs falsehood with no less readiness than the advocate who is defending a bad case before a jury?  Again, suppose that the judge is likely to condemn acts which were rightly done, unless we can convince him that they were never done.  Is not his another case where the orator will not shrink even from life's, if so he may save one who is not merely innocent, but a praiseworthy citizen?  Again, suppose that we realize that certain acts are just in the themselves, though prejudicial to the state under existing circumstances.  Shall we not  then employ methods of speaking which, despite the excellence of their intention, bear a close resemblance to fraud.  Further, no one will hesitate for a moment to hold the view that it is in the interest of the common wealth that guilty persons should be acquitted rather than punished, if it be possible thereby to convert them to a better state of mind, a possibility which is generally conceded.  If then it is clear to an orator that a man who is guilty of the offences laid to his charge will become a good man, will he not strive to secure his acquittal?  Imagine for example that a skilful commander, without whose aid the state cannot hope to crush its enemies, is laboring under charge which is obviously true:  will not the common interest irresistibly summon our orator to defend him?  We know at any rate that Fabrics publicly voted for an secured the election to the consulate of Corneltus Rufinus, despite the fact that he was a bad citizen and his personal enemy, merely because he knew that he was a capable general and the state was threatened with war.  And when certain persons expressed their surprise at his conduct, he replied that he had rather be robbed by a fellow-citizen than be sold as a slave by the enemy.  Well then, had Fabricius been an orator, would he not have defended Rufinus against a charge of peculation, even though his guilt were as clear as day? I might produce many other similar examples, but one of them taken at random is enough. For my purpose is not assert that such tasks will often be incumbent on  the orator whom I desire to form, but merely to show that, in the event of his being compelled to take such action, it will not invalidate our definition of an orator as a "good man, skilled in speaking." And it is necessary also both to teach and learn how to establish difficult cases by proof. For often even the best cases have a resemblance to bad and, the charges which tell heavily against an innocent person frequently have a strong resemblance to the truth. Consequently, the same methods of defence have to be employed that would be used if he were guilty. Further, there are countless elements which are common to both good cases and bad, such as oral and documentary evidence, suspicions and opinions, all of which have too be established or disposed of in the same way , whether they be true or merely resemble that truth. Therefore, while maintaining his integrity of purpose, the orator will modify his pleading to suit the circumstances.  
     
The Importance of Education in Virtue   II.  Since then the oration is good man, and such goodness cannot be conceived as existing apart from virtue, virtue, despite the fact that is in part derived from certain natural impulses, will require to be perfected by instruction. The orator must above all things devote his attention to the formation of moral character and must aquire a complete knowledge if all that is just and honourable. For without this knowledge no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking, unless indeed we agree with those who regard morality as intuitive and as owing nothing to instruction : indeed they go so far as to acknowledge that handicrafts, not excluding even those which are most despised among them, can only be acquired by the result of teaching, whereas virtue, which of all gifts to man is that which makes him most near akin to the immortal gods, comes to him without search or effort, as a natural concomitant of birth. But can the man who does not know what abstinence is, claim to be truly abstinent? or brave, if he has never purged his soul of the fears of pain, death and superstition? or just, if he has never, in language approaching that of philosophy, discussed the nature of virtue and justice, or the laws have been given to mankind by nature or established among individual peoples and nations?  What a contempt is argues for such themes to regard them as being so easy of comprehension!  However, I pass this by ; for I am sure that no one whit the least smattering of literary culture will have the slightest hesitation in agreeing with me.  I will proceed to my next point, that no one will achieve sufficient skill even in speaking, unless he makes a thorough study of all the workings of nature and forms his character on the workings of nature and forms his character on the precepts of philosophy and the dictates of reason. For it is with good cause that Lucius Crassus, in the the book of the de Oratore, affirms that all that is said concerning equity, truth and the good , and their opposites, forms part of the studies of an orator, and that the philosophers, when they exert their powers of speaking to defend these virtues, using the weapons of rhetoric, not their own.  But he also confesses that the knowledge of there subjects must be sought from the philosophers for the reasons that , in his opinion, philosophy has more effective possession of them.   And it is for the same reason that Cicero in several of his books and letters proclaims that eloquence has its fountain-head in the most secret springs of wisdom, and that consequently for a considerable time the instructors of morals and of eloquence where identical.  Accordingly this exhortation of mine must not be taken to mean that I wish the orator to be a philosopher, since there is no other way of life that is further removed from the duties of a statesman and the tasks of an orator. For what philosopher has been a frequent speaker in the courts or won renown in public assemblies?  Nay, what philosopher has taken a prominent part in the government of the state, which forms the most frequent theme of their instructions? None the less I desire that he, whose character I am seeking to mould, should be a "wise man" in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.  But inasmuch as the study of philosophy has been deserted by  those who have turned to the pursuit of eloquence, and since philosophy no longer moves in its true sphere of actions and it the board daylight of the forum, but has retired first to porches and gymnasia and finally to the gatherings of the schools, all that is essential for an orator, and yet is not taught by the professors of essential for an orator, and yet is not taught by the professors of eloquence, must undoubtedly be sought from those persons in whose possession it has remained. The authors who have discoursed on the nature of virtue must be read through and through, that the life of the orator may be wedded to the knowledge of things human and divine.  But how much greater and fairer would such subjects appear if those who taught them were also those who could give them most eloquent expression!  O that the day may dawn when the perfect orator of our heart's desire shall claim for his own possession that science that has lost the affection of mankind through the arrogance of its claims the vices of some that have brought disgrace upon its virtues, and shall restore it to its place in the domain of eloquence, as thought he had been victorious in a trial for the restoration of stolen goods!  And since philosophy falls into three divisions, ethics and dialectic, which, I ask you , of these  departments is not closely connected with the task of the orator?  
     
  Let us reverse the order just given and deal first with the third department which is entirely concerned with words.  If it be true that to know the properties of each word, to clear away ambiguities, to unravel perplexities, to distinguish between truth and falsehood, to prove or to refute as may be desired, all from part of the functions of an orator, who is there that can doubt the truth of my contention?  I grant that we shall not have to employ dialectic with such minute attention to detail when we are pleading in the courts as where we are engaged in philosophical debate, since the orator's duty is not merely to instruct, but also to move and delight his audience; and to succeed in doing this he needs a strength, impetuosity and grace as well. For oratory is like a river : the current is stronger when it flows within deep banks and with a mighty flood,  than when the waters are shallow and broken by the pebbles that bar their way.  And just as the trainers of the wrestling school do not impart the various throws to their pupils that those who have learnt tem may make us of all of them in actual wrestling matches (for weight and strength and wind count for more that these), but that they may have a store from which to draw one or two of suck tricks, as occasion may offer; even so the science of dialectic,  or if you prefer it disputation, while it is often useful in definition, inference, differentiation, resolution of ambiguity, distinction and classification, as also in luring on or entangling our opponents, yet if it claim to assume the entire direction of the struggles of the forum, will merely stand in the way of arts superior to itself and by its very subtlety will exhaust the strength that has been pared down to suit its limitations. As a result you will find that certain persons who show astonishing skill in philosophical debate, as soon as they quit the sphere of their quibbles, are as helpless in any case that demands more serious pleading as those small animals which, through nimble enough in a confined space, are easily captured in an open field.   
     
The Study of Ethics   Proceeding to moral philosophy or ethics, we may note that is at any rate is entirely suited to the orator.  For vast as is the variety of cases (since in them, as I have pointed out in previous books, we seek to discover certain points by means of definition, dispose of others on legal grounds or by raising the question of competence, while other points are established syllogism and others involve contradictions or are diversely interpreted owing to some ambiguity of language), there is scarcely a single one which does not at some point or another involve the discussion of equity and virtue, while there are also, as everyone knows, not a few which turn entirely on questions of quality.  Again in deliberative assemblies how can we advise a policy without raising the question of what is honorable? Nay, even the third department of oratory, which is concerned with the tasks of praise and denunciation, must without a doubt deal with questions of right and wrong.  For the orator will assuredly have much to say on such topics as justice, fortitude, abstinence, self-control and piety.  But the good man, who has come to the knowledge of these things not by mere hearsay, as though they were just words and names for his tong to employ, but has grasped the meaning of virtue and acquired a true feeling for it, will never be perplexed when he has to think out a problem,  but will speak out truly what he knows.  Since, however, general questions are always more important than special (for the particular is contained in the universal, while the universal is never to be regarded as something superimposed on the particular), everyone will readily admit that the studies of which we are speaking are pre-eminently concerned with general questions.  Further, since there are numerous points which require to be determined by appropriate and concise definitions (hence the definitive basis of cases), it is surely desirable that the orator should be instructed in such things by those who have devoted special attention to the subject.  Again, does not every question of law turn either on the precise meaning of words, the discussion of equality, of conjecture as to the intention- subjects which in part encroach on the domain of dialectic and in part on that of ethics? Consequently all oratory univalves a natural admixture of all these philosophic elements- at least, that is to say, all oratory that us worthy of the mane. For mere garrulity that is ignorant of such learning must needs go astray, since it guides are either non-existent or false.   
     
The Study of Physics   Physics on the other hand is far richer than the other branches of philosophy, if viewed from the standpoint of providing exercise in speaking, in proportion as a loftier than of things human ;  and further it includes within its scope the whole of ethics, which as we have shown are essential to the very existence of oratory. For, if world is governed by providence, it will certainly be the duty of all good men to bear their part in the administration of the state. If the origin of our souls divine, we must win our way towards virtue and abjure the service of the lust of our earthly body. Are not theses themes which the orator will frequently be called upon to handle?  Again there are questions concerned with auguries and oracles or any other religions topic ( all of them subjects that have often given rise to the most important debates in the senate) on which the orator will have to discourse, if he also to be the statesman we would have him be.  And finally, how can we conceive of any real eloquence at all proceedings from a man who is ignorant of all that is best in the world?  If our reason did not make these facts obvious, we should still be led by historical examples to believe their truth.  For Pericles, whose eloquence, despite the fact that it has left no visible record for posterity, was none the less if, we may believe the historians and that free-speaking tribe, the old comic poets, endowed whit almost incredible force, is known to have been a pupil of the physicist Anaxagoras, while Demosthenes, greatest of all the orators of Greece, sat at the feet of Plato.  As for Cicero, he has often proclaimed the fact that he owed less to the schools of rhetoric that to the walks of Academe: nor would he ever developed such amazing fertility of talent,  had he bounded his genius by the limits of the forum and not by the frontiers of nature herself.   
     
Selecting a Philosophical School   But this leads me to another question as to which school of philosophy is like to prove of most service to oratory, although there are only a few that can be said to contend for this honor.  For in the first place Epicurus banishes us from his presence without more ado, since dibs all his followers to fly from learning in the swiftest ship that they can find Nor would Arstippus, who regards the highest good as consisting in physical pleasure, be likely to exhort us to the toils entailed by our study.  And what part can Pyrrho have  in the work that us before us?  For he will have doubts as to whether there exist judges to address, accused to defend, or a senate where he can be called upon to speak his opinion.  Some authorities hold that the Academy will be the most useful school, on the ground that its habit of disputing on both sides of a question approaches most nearly to the actual practice of the courts. And by way of proof they add the fact that this school has produced speakers highly renowned for their eloquence.  The Peripatetics also make it their boast that they have a form of study which is near akin to oratory.  For it was with them in the main that originated the practice of declaiming on general questions by way of exercise.  The Stoics, though driven to admit that,  generally speaking, their teachers have been deficient both in fullness and charm of eloquence, still contended that no mean can prove more acutely or draw conclusions with greater subtlety than themselves.  But all these arguments take place within their own circle, for as though they were tired by some solemn oath or held fast in the bonds of some superstitious belief, they consider that it is a crime to abandon a conviction once formed. On the other hand, there is no need for an orator to swear allegiance to any one philosophic code.  For he has a greater and nobler aim, to which he directs all his efforts with as much zeal as if he were a candidate for office, since he is to be made perfect not only in the glory of a virtuous life, but in that of eloquence as well. He will consequently select as his models of eloquence all the greatest masters of oratory, and will choose the noblest precepts and the most direct road road to virtue as the means for as the means for the formation of an upright character. He will neglect no form of exercise, but will devote special attention to those which are of the highest and fairest nature.  For what subject can be found more fully adapted to a rich and eloquence than the topics of virtue, politics, providence, the origin of the soul and friendship?  The themes which tend to elevate mind and language alike are questions such as what things are truly good, what means there are of assuaging fear, restraining the passion and lifting us and the soul that came from heaven clear of the delusions of the common heard.   
     
The Importance of Examples/Precepts from the Past   But it is desirable that we should not restrict our study to the precepts of philosophy alone.  It is still more important that we should know and ponder continually all the noblest sayings and deeds that have been handed down to us from ancient times.  And assuredly we shall nowhere find a larger or more remarkable store of these than in the records of our own country.  Who will teach courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, simplicity, and contempt of grief and pain better than men like Fabricius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mucius and countless others?  For if the Greeks bear away the pain for moral precepts, Rome can produce more striking examples of moral performance, which is a far greater thing.  But the man who does not believe that is enough to fix his eyes merely on his own age and his own transitory life, but regards the space allotted for an honorable life and the course in which glory's race is run as conditional solely by the memory of posterity, will not rest content with a mere knowledge of the events of history. No it is from the thought of posterity that he must inspire his duty to display when he pleads in the courts or gives counsel in the senate. No man will ever be the consummate orator of whom we are in question unless he has both the knowledge and the courage to speak in accordance with the promptings of honor.   
     
Other Important Areas of Education   III.  Our orator will also require a knowledge of civil law and of the custom and religion of the state in whose life he is to bear his part.  For how will he be able to advise either in public or in private, if he is ignorant of all the main elements that go to make the state?  How can he truthfully call himself an advocate if he has to go to others to acquire that knowledge which is all- important in the courts? He will be little better than if he were a reciter of the poets.  For he will be mere transmitter of the instructions that others have given him, it will be on the authority of others that he propounds what he asks the judge to believe, he whose duty it is to succor the litigant will himself be in need of succour.  It is that at times may be effected with but little inconvenience, if what he advances for the edification of the judge has been taught him and composed in the seclusion of his study and learnt by heart there like other elements of the case.  But what will he do, when he is confronted by unexpected problems such as frequently arise in the actual course of pleading?  Will he not disgrace himself by looking round and asking the junior counsel who sit on the benches behind him for advice? Can he hope to get a thorough grasp of such information at the very moment when he is required to produce it in his speech?  Can he make his assertions with confidence or speak with native simplicity as though his arguments were his own?  Grant that he may do so in his actual speech.  But what will he do in a debate, when he has continually to meet fresh points raised by his opponent and is given no time to learn up his case?  What will he do, if he has no legal expert to advise him or if prompter through insufficient knowledge of the subject provides him with information that is false?  It is the most serious drawback of such ignorance, that he will always believe that his adviser knows what he is talking about. I am not ignorant of the generally prevailing custom, nor have I forgotten those who sit by our store-chests and provide weapons for the pleader:  I know too that Greeks did likewise: hence the name of pragmaticus which was bestowed on such persons.  But I am speaking of an orator, who owes it as duty to his case to serve it not mearely by the loudness of his voice, but by all other means that may be of assistance to it.  Consequently I do ot wish my orator to be helpless, if it so change that he puts in an appearance for the preliminary proceedings to which the hour befor the commencement of the trial is allotted, or to be unskilful in the preparation and production of evidence.  For who, sooner than himself, should prepare the points which he wishes to be brought out when he is pleading?  You might as well supposed that thequalifications of a successful general consist merely in courage and energy in the field of battle and skill in meeting all the demands of actual conflict, while suffering him to be ignorant of the methods of levying troops, mustering and equipping his forces, arranging for supplies or selecting a suitable position for his camp , despite the fact that preparation for war is an essential preliminary for its successful conduct.  And yet such a general would bear a very close resemblance to the advocate who leaves much of the denial that necessary for success to the care of others, more especially in view of the fact that this , the most necessary element in the management of a case, is not as difficult as it may perhaps seem to outside observers.  For every point of law, which is certain, is based either on written law or accepted custom :  if, on the other hand,  the light of equality.  Laws which are either written or founded on accepted custom present no difficulty, since they call merely for knowledge and make no demand on the imagination.  On the other hand, the points explained in the rulings of the legal experts turn either on the interpretation of words or on the distinction between right and wrong. To understand the meaning of each word is either common to all sensible men or the special possession of the orator,  while the demands of equity are known to every good man.  Now I regard the orator above all as being a man of virtue and good sense, who will not be seriously troubled, after having devoted himself to the study of that which is excellent by nature, if some legal expert disagrees with him ;  for even they are allowed to disagree among themselves.  But if he further wishes to know the views of everyone,  he will require to read, and reading is the least laborious of all the tasks that fall to the student's lot.  Moreover, if the class of legal experts is as a rule drawn from those who, in despair of making successful pleaders, have taken refuge with the law,  how easy it must be for an orator to know what those succeed in learning, who by their own confession are incapable of becoming orators!  But Marcus Cato was at once a great orator and an expert lawyer, while Scaevola and Servius Sulpicius were universally allowed to be eloquent as well. And Cicero not merely possessed a sufficient supply of legal knowledge to service his needs when pleading, but actually began to write on the subject, so that it is clear that an orator has not merely time to learn, but even to teach the law.   
     
  Let no one, however regard the advice I have given as to the attention due to the development of character and the study of the law as being by the fact that we are familiar with many who, because they were weary of the toil entailed on those who seek to scale the heights of eloquence, have betaken themselves to study of law as a refuge for their indolence.  Some of these transfer their attention to the praetor's edicts or the civil law and have preferred to become specialists in formulae, or the civil law,  and have preferred to become specialists in formulae, or legalists, as Cicero calls them, on the pretext of choosing a move useful branch of study,  whereas their real motive was its comparative easiness. Others are the victims of a more arrogant of sloth;  they assume a stern air left their beards grow, and, as though despising the precepts of oratory, sit for a while in the school of the philosophers, that by an assumption of a severe mien before the public gaze and by an affected contempt of others they may assert their moral superiority, while leading a life of debauchery at home.  For philosophy may be counterfeited, but eloquence never.         
     

Source:  Quintilian. Institutes of Oratory.  4 vols.  Trans.  H.E. Butler.  London:  William Heinemann, 1920.

© M. Russo, 2000.  Although this translation of Quintilian's Institutes is in the public domain, the specific electronic form of the text is copyright.  Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in print form for educational purposes and personal use.  If you reduplicate the document, be sure to indicate the source.  No permission is granted for commercial use.

Thanks to Lisa Anthony Seja for his help in preparing this text.

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