XV. The first question which confronts us is "What is rhetoric?" Many definitions have been given; but the problem is really twofold for the dispute turns either on the quality of the thing itself or on the meaning of the words in which it is defined. the first and chief disagreement on the subject is found in the fact that some think that even bad men may be called orators, while others, of whom I am one, restrict the name of orator and the art itself to those who are good. Of those who divorce eloquence from that yet fairer and more desirable title to renown, a virtuous life, some call rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a virtue some a practice some an art though they will not allow the art to have anything in common with science or virtue, while some again call it a perversion of art.... These persons have as a rule held that the task of oratory lies in persuasion or speaking in a persuasive manner: for this is within the power of a bad man no less than a good. Hence we got the common definition of rhetoric as the power many call a capacity and some a faculty.... 

    Cicero in more than one passage defined the duty of an orator as "speaking in a persuasive manner."  In his Rhetorica too a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he makes the end to be persuasion. But many other things have the power of persuasion such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individuals great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person. Thus when Antonius in the course of his defense of Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honorable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes he relied no longer on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused. Again there is a speech of Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation sole by the pity which he aroused not only by producing his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpicius Gallus. So also according to general opinion Phryne was saved not by the eloquence if Hyperides, admirable as it was,. but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed the drawing aside her tunic. And if all these have power to persuasion by speaking, pride themselves on the greater exactness of language. This definition is given by Gorgias in the dialogue mentioned above, under compulsion from the inexorable logic of Socrates. Theodectes agrees with him, whether the treatise on rhetoric which has come down to us under his name is really by him, or as is generally believed, by Aristotle. In that work the end of rhetoric is defined as the leading of men by the power of speech to the conclusion desired by the orator. But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by speaking or lead others to the conclusion desired, as for example harlots, flatterers and seduces. 

    On the other hand the orator is not always engaged on persuasion, so that sometimes persuasion is not his special object while sometimes persuasion is not his special object while sometimes shared by others who are far removed from being orators. And yet Apollodorus is not very far off this definition when he asserts that the first and all-important task of forensic oratory is to persuade the judge and lead his mind to the conclusions desired by the speaker. For even Apollodorus makes the orator the sport of fortune by refusing him leave to retain his title if he fails to persuade. Some on the other hand pay no attention to results, as for example Aristotle, who says "rhetoric is the power of discovering all means of persuading by speech." This definition has not merely the fault already mentioned, but the additional defect of including merely  the power of invention, which without style cannot possibly constitute oratory. Herm agoras, who asserts that its end is to speak persuasively, and others who express the same opinion, though in different words, and inform us that the end is to say everything which ought to be said with a view to persuasion, have been sufficiently answered above, which I proved that persuasion was not the privilege of the orator alone. 

    Various additions have been made to these definitions. For some hold that rhetoric is concerned with everything, while some restrict its activity to politics. The question as to which of these views is the nearer to the truth shall be discussed later in its appropriate place. Aristotle seems to have implied that the sphere of the orator was all inclusive when he defined rhetoric as the power to detect every element in any given subject which might conduce to persuasion; so too does Patrocles who omits the words in any given subject, but since he excludes nothing, shows that his view is identical. For he defines rhetoric as the power to discover whatever is persuasive in speech.  These definitions like that quoted above include no more than the power of invention alone. Theodorus avoid this fault and holds that it is the power to discover and to utter forth in elegant language whatever is credible in every subject of oratory. But, while others besides orators may discover what is credible as well as persuasive, by adding the words in every subject he, to a greater extend than the others, concedes the fairest name in the world to those who use their gifts as incitement to crime.  Plato make Gorgias say that he is a master of persuasion in the law-courts and other assemblies, and that his themes are justice and injustice, while in reply Socrates allows him the power of persuading, but not of teaching....

    For my part, I have undertaken the task of molding the ideal orator, and as my first desire is that he should be a good man, I will return to those who have sounder opinions on the subject. Some however identify rhetoric with politics, Cicero calls it a department of the science of politics (and science of politics and philosophy are identical terms), while others again call it a branch of philosophy, among them Isocrates. The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself.... Another definition defines oratory as the power of persuading men to do what ought to be done, and yields practically the same sense save that it limits the art to the result which it produces. Areus again define it well as speaking according to the excellence of speech. Those who regard it as the science of political obligations, also exclude men of bad character from the title of orator, if by science the mean virtue, but restrict it overmuch by confining it to political problems. Albutius, a distinguished author and professor of rhetoric, agrees that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, but makes a mistake in imposing restrictions by the addition of the words on political questions and with credibility; with both of these restrictions I have already dealt. finally those critics who hold that the aim of rhetoric is to think and speak rightly, were on the correct track.

    These are practically all the most celebrated and most discussed definitions of rhetoric. It would be both irrelevant and beyond my power to deal with all. For strongly disapprove of the custom which has come to prevail among writers of text-books of refusing to define anything in the same terms as have been employed by some previous writer. I will have nothing to do with such ostentation. What I say will not necessarily be my own invention, but it will be what I believe to  to be the right view, as for instance that oratory is the science of speaking well. For when the most satisfactory definition has been found, he who seeks another, is merely looking for worse one.

    Thus much being admitted we are now in a position  to see clearly what is the end , and the highest aim, the ultimate goal of rhetoric, that télos in fact which every art must possess. For if rhetoric is the science of speaking well, its end and highest aim is to speak well.

XVI. There follows the question as to whether rhetoric is useful. Some are in the habit of denouncing it most violently and of shamelessly employing the powers of oratory to accuse oratory itself. "It is eloquence" they say "that snatches criminals from the penalties of the law, eloquence that from time to time secures the condemnation of the innocent and leads deliberation astray, eloquence that stirs up not merely sedition and popular tumult, but wars beyond all expiation, and that is most effective when it makes falsehood prevail over the truth." The comic poets even accuse Socrates of teaching how to make the worse cause seem better, while Plato says that Gorgias and Tisias made similar professions. 

    And to these they add further examples drawn from the history of Rome and Greece, enumerated all those who used their pernicious eloquence not merely against individuals but against whole states and threw an ordered commonwealth into a state of turmoil or even brought it to utter ruin; and they point out that for this very reason rhetoric was banished from Sparta, while its powers were cut down at Athens itself by the fact that an orator was forbidden to stir the passions of his audience. On the showing of these critics not only orators but generals, magistrates, medicine and philosophy itself will all be useless. For Flaminus was a general, while men such as Gracchi, Saturninus and Glaucia were magistrates.  Doctors have been caught using poisons, and those who falsely assume the name of philosopher have occasionally been detected in the gravest crimes.  Let us give up eating, it often makes us ill; let us never go inside houses for sometimes they collapse on their occupants; let never a sword be forged for a soldier, since it might be used by a robber.  And who does not realize that fire and water, both necessities of life, and, to leave mere earthly things, even the sun and moon, the greatest of the heavenly bodies, are occasionally capable of doing harm.

    On the other hand will it be denied that it was by his gift of speech that Appius the blind broke off the dishonorable peace which was on the point of being concluded with Pyrrhus?  Did not the divine eloquence of Cicero win popular applause even when he denounced the Agrarian laws, did it not crush the audacious plots of Catiline and win, while he still wore the garb of civil life, the highest honor that can be conferred on a victorious general, a public thanksgiving to heaven?  Has not oratory often revived the courage of a panic-stricken army and persuaded the soldier faced by all the perils of war that glory is a fairer thing than life itself?  Nor shall the history of Sparta and Athens move me more than that of the Roman people, who have always held the orator in highest honor.  Never in my opinion would the founders of cities have induced their unsettled multitudes to form communities had they not moved them by the magic of their eloquence: never without the highest gifts of oratory would the great legislators have constrained mankind to submit themselves to the yoke of law.  Nay, even the principles which should guide our life, however fair they may be by nature, yet have greater power to mould the mind to virtue, when the beauty of things is illumined by the splendor of eloquence.  Wherefore, although the weapons of oratory may be used either for good or ill, it is unfair to regard that as an evil which can be employed for good.

    These problems, however, may be left to those who hold that rhetoric is the power to persuade. If our definition of rhetoric as the science of speaking well implies that an orator must be a good man, there can be no doubt about its usefulness. And in the truth that god, who was in the beginning, the father of all things and the architect of the universe, distinguished man from all other living creatures that are subject to death, by nothing more than this, that he gave him the gift of speech. For as regards physical bulk, strength, robustness, endurance or speed, man is surpasses in certain causes by dumb beasts, who also are far more independent of external assistance. They know by instinct without  need of any teacher how to move rapidly, to feed themselves and swim. Many too have their bodies clothed against cold, possess natural weapons and have not to search for their food, whereas in all these respects man's life is full of toil. 

    Reason then was the greatest gift of the Almighty, who willed that we should share its possession with the immortal gods. But reason by itself would help us but little and be far less evident in us, had we not the power to express our thoughts in speech; for it is the lack of this power rather than thought and understanding, which they do to a certain extent possess, that is the great defect in other living things. The construction of a soft lair, the weaving of nests, the hatching and rearing of their young, and even the storing up of food for the coming winter, together with certain other achievements which we cannot imitate, such as the making of honey and wax, all these perhaps indicate the possession of a certain degree of reason; but since the creatures that do these things lack the gift of speech they are called dumb and unreasoning beasts. Finally, how little the heavenly boon of reason avails those who are born dumb. 

    If therefore we have received no fairer gift from heaven than speech, what shall we regard as so worthy of laborious cultivation, or in what should we sooner desire to excel our fellow-men, than that in which mankind excels all other living things? And we should be all the more eager to do so, since there is no art which yields a more grateful recompense for the labor bestowed upon it. This will be abundantly clear if we consider the origins of oratory and the progress it has made; and it is capable of advancing still further. I will not stop to point out how useful and how becoming a task it is for a good man to defend his friends, to guide the senate by his counsels, and to lead peoples or armies to follow his bidding; I merely ask, is it not a noble thing, by employing the understanding which is common to mankind and the words that are used by all, to win such honor and glory that you seem not to speak or plead, but rather, as was said of Pericles, to thunder and lighten?

XVII.  However, if I were to indulge my own inclinations in expatiating on this subject, I should go on forever. Let us therefore pass to the next question and consider whether rhetoric is an art. No one of those who have laid down the rules for oratory has ever doubted that it is an art. It is clear even from the titles of their books that their theme is the art of rhetoric, while Cicero defines rhetoric as artistic eloquence. And it is not merely the orators who have claimed this distinction for their studies with a view to giving them an additional title to respect, but the Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers for the most part agree with them. 

    Indeed I will confess that I had doubts as to whether I should discuss this portion of my inquiry, for there is no one, I will not say so unlearned, but so devoid of ordinary sense, as to hold that building, weaving or moulding vessels from clay and arts, at the same time to consider that rhetoric, which, as I have already said, is the noblest and most sublime of tasks, has reached such a lofty eminence without the assistance of art. For my own part i think that those who have argued against this view did not realize what they were saying, but merely desired to exercise their wits by the selection of a difficult theme, like Polycrates, when he praised Busiris and Clytemnestra; I may add that he is credited with a not dissimilar performance, namely the composition of a speech which was delivered against Socrates. 

    Some would have it that rhetoric is a natural gift though they admit that it can be developed by practice. So Antonius in the De Oratore of Cicero styles it a knack derived from experience, but denies that it is an art: this statement is however not intended to be accepted by us as the actual truth, but is inserted to make Antonius speak in character, since he was in the habit of concealing his art. Still Lysias is said to have maintained this same view, which is defended on the ground that uneducated persons, barbarians and slaves, when speaking on their own behalf, say something that resembles an exordium, state the facts of the case, prove, refute and plead for mercy just as an orator does in his peroration. To this is added the quibble that nothing that is based on art can have existed before the art in question, whereas men has always from time immemorial spoken in their own defense or in denunciation of others: the teaching of rhetoric as an art was, they say, a later invention dating from about he time of Tisias and Corax: oratory therefore existed before art and consequently cannot be art. 

    For my part I am not concerned with the date when oratory began to be taught. Even in Homer we find Phoenix as an instructor not only of conduct but of speaking, while a number of orators are mentioned, the various styles are repesented by the speeches of three of the chiefs and the young men are set to contend among themselves in contests of eloquence: moreover and pleaders are represented in the engravings on the shield of Achilles. It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature. Otherwise we might deny the title of art to medicine, which was discovered from the observation of sickness and health, according to some is entirely based upon experiment: wounds were bound up long before medicine developed into an art, and fevers were reduced by rest and abstention from food, long before the reason for such treatment was known, simply because the state of the patient's health left no choice. So too building should not be styled in art; for primitive man built himself a hut without the assistance of art. Music by the same reasoning is not an art; for every race indulges in some kind of singing and dancing. 

    If therefore any kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will admit that it existed before it was an art. If on the other hand not every man that speaks is an orator and primitive man did not speak like an orator, my opponents must needs acknowledge that oratory is the product of art and did not exist before it. This conclusion also rules out their argument that men speak who have never learnt to speak, and that which a man does untaught can have no connection with art. 

    In support of this contention they adduce the fact that Demades was a waterman and Aeschines an actor, but both were orators. Their reasoning is false. For no man can be an orator untaught and it would be truer to say that these orators learned oratory late in life than that they never learned at all; although as a  matter of fact Aeschines had an acquaintance with literature from childhood since his father was a teacher of literature, while as regards Demades, it is quite uncertain that he never studied rhetoric and in any case continuous practice in speaking was sufficient to bring him to such proficiency as he attained: for experience is the best of all schools. On the other hand  it may fairly be asserted that he would have achieved greater distinction, if he had received instruction: for although he delivered his speeches with great effect, he never ventured to write them for others. 

    Aristotle, it is true, in his Gryllus produces some tentative arguments to  the contrary, which are marked by characteristic ingenuity. On the other hand he also wrote three books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which he not merely admits that rhetoric is an art, but treats it as a department of politics and also of logic. Critolaus and Athenodorus of Rhodes have produced many arguments against this view, while Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he is going to indict rhetoric. As to the statements of Epicurus on this subject, they cause me no surprise, for he is the foe of all systematic training.

    These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity. Their first contention is based on the subject-matter (which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has none, which I shall show in what follows to be false. 

    Another slander is to the effect that no art will acquiesce in false opinions: since an art must be based on direct perception, which is always true: now, say they, rhetoric does give its assent to false conclusions and is therefore not an art. I will admit that rhetoric sometimes substitutes falsehood for truth, but I will not allow that it does so because its opinions are false, since there is all the difference between holding a certain opinion oneself and persuading someone else to adopt an opinion. For instance a general frequently makes use of falsehood: Hannibal when hemmed in by Fabius persuaded his enemy that he was in retreat by tying brushwood to the horns of oxen, setting fire to them by night and driving the herds across the mountains opposite. But though he deceived Fabius, he himself was fully aware of the truth. Again when the Spartan Theopompus changed clothes with his wife and escaped from custody disguised as a woman, he deceived his guards, but was not for a moment deceived as to his own identity. Similarly an orator, when he substitutes falsehood for the truth, is aware of the falsehood and of the fact that he is substituting it for the truth. He therefore deceives others, but not himself. When Cicero boasted that he had thrown dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of Cluentius, he was far from being blinded himself. And when a painter by his artistic skill makes us believe that certain objects project form the picture, while others are withdrawn into the background, he knows perfectly well that they are really all in the same plane. 

    My opponents further assert that every art has some definite goal towards which it directs its efforts, but that rhetoric as a rule has no such goal,  while at other times it professes to have an aim, but fails to perform its promise. They lie: I have already shown that rhetoric has a definite purpose and have explained what it is. And, what is more, the orator will always make good his professions in this respect, for he will always speak well. On the other hand, this criticism may perhaps hold good as against those who think persuasion the end of oratory. But our orator and his art, as we define it, are independent of results. The speaker aims at victory, it is true, but if he speaks well he has lived up to the ideals of his art, even if he is defeated. Similarly a pilot will desire to bring his ship safe to harbor; but if he is swept out of his course by a storm, he will not for that reason cease to be a pilot, but will say in the well-know words of the old poet "Still let me steer straight on!"  So too the doctor seeks to heal the sick; but if the violence of the disease or the refusal of the patient to obey his regimen or any other circumstance prevent his achieving his purpose, he will not  have fallen short of the ideals of his art, provided he  had done everything according to reason. So too the operator's purpose is fulfilled if he has spoken well. For the art of rhetoric, as I shall show later, is realized in action., not in the result obtained. From this it follows that there is no truth in yet another argument which contends that arts know when they have attained their end, whereas rhetoric does not.  For every speaker is aware when he is speaking well.  

     These critics also charge rhetoric with doing what no art does, namely making use of vices to serve its ends, since it speaks the thing that is not and excited the passions.  But there is no disgrace in doing either of these things, as long as the motive be good:  consequently there is nothing vicious in such action.  Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie, while the orator must needs excite the passions, if that be the only way be which the can lead the judge to do justice.  For judges are not always enlightened and often have to be tricked t prevent them falling into error.  Give me philosophers as judges, and false witness; consequently there will be very little scope for eloquence whose value will lie almost entirely in its power to charm.  But if, as is the case, our hearers are fickle of mind, and truth is exposed to a host of perils, we must cal in art to aid us in the fight and employ such means as will help our case.  He who has been driven from the right road cannot be brought back to it save by a fresh detour.

    The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest number of these captious accusations against rhetoric, is found in the allegation that orators speak indifferently on either side of a case.  From which they draw the following arguments: no art is self-contradictory, but rhetoric does contradict itself; no art tries to demolish what itself has build, but this does happen it in he operations of rhetoric; or again:- rhetoric teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said; consequently it is not an art because it teaches what ought to e said, it because while it teaches what out to be said, it also teaches precisely the opposite.  Now it is obvious that all such charges are brought  against that type of rhetoric has no place therein and based on injustice rhetoric has no place their in and consequently it can scarcely happen even under the most exceptional circumstances that an orator that is to say, a good man, will speak indifferently on either side.  Still it is in the nature of things conceivable that just causes may lead two wise men may fight among themselves, provided that hey do so at the bidding of reason.  I will therefore reply to their criticisms in such way that it will be clear that these arguments have no  force even against those who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character.  For rhetoric is not self-contradictory.   The conflict is and sometimes himself states things of which he has no actual knowledge."  Now one of these points, namely whether the judges have knowledge of what is being aid to them, has nothing to do with the art of oratory.  The other statement, that art is concerned with things that are known, does however require an answer.  Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and the orator knows how to speak well.  "But," it is urged, "he does not know whether what he says is true."  Neither do they, who assert that all things derive their origin from fire or weather or the four elements or indivisible atoms; nor they who calculate the distances of the starts or the size of the earth and sun.  And yet all these call the subject which they teach an art.  But if reason makes them seem not merely to hold opinions but, thanks to the cogency of the proofs adduced, to have actual knowledge, reason will do the same service to the orator.  "But," they say, "he does not know whether the cause which he has undertaken is true."  But not even a doctor can tell whether a patient who claims to be suffering from a headache really is so suffering: but he will treat him on the assumption that his statement is true, and medicine will still be an art.  Again what of the fact that rhetoric does not always aim to telling the truth, but always at stating what is problem?  The answer is that advocates often defend in one case what they have attacked in another.  This is not the fault of the art, but of the man.  Such are the  main points that are urged against rhetoric; there are other as well, but they are of minor importance and drawn from the same sources. 

    That rhetoric is an art may, however, be proved in a very few words.  For if Cleanthes definition be accepted that "Art is a power reaching its ends by a definite path, that is, by ordered methods," none can doubt that there is such method and order in good speaking:  while if, on the other hand, we accept the definition which meets with almost universal approval that art consists in perceptions agreeing and cooperation to the achievement of some useful end, we shall be able to show that rhetoric lacks none of these characteristic.  

    Again it is scarcely necessary for me to point out that like other arts it is based on examination and practice.  And if logic is an art, as is general agreed, rhetoric must also be an art, sine it differs from logic in species rather than in genus.  Nor must I omit to point out that where it is possible in any given subject for one man to act without art and another with art, there must necessarily be an art in connation with that subject, as there must also be in any subject in which the man who has received instruction is that superior to him who has not.  But as regards the practice of rhetoric, it is not merely the case that he trained speaker will get the better of the untrained.  For even the trained man will prove inferior to one who has received a better training.  If this were not so, there would  not be so many rhetorical rules, nor would so many great men have come forward to teach them.  The truth of this must be acknowledged by everyone, but more especially by us, since we concede the possession of oratory to none save the good man.

XXI.  As to the material oratory, some have asserted that it is speech, as for instance Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato.  If this view be accepted in the sense that the word "speech" is used of a discourse composed on any subject then it is not the material, but the work, just as a statue is the work of the sculptor.  For speeches like statues require art for their production.  If on the other hand we interpret "speech" as indicating the words themselves, they can do nothing unless they are related to facts.  Some again hold that the material consists of persuasive arguments.  But they form part of the work, are produced by art and require material themselves.  Some say that political question provide the material.  The mistake made by these lies not in the quality of their opinion but in its limitation.  For political questions are material for eloquence but not the only material.  Some, on the ground that rhetoric is a virtue, make the material with which it deals to be the whole of life.  Others, on the ground that life regarded as a whole does not provide material for every virtue, since most of them are concerned only with department of morals which deals with the business of life.  

    For my own part, and I have authority to support me, I hold that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech.  Plato, if I read him aright, makes Socrates say to Gorgias that its material is to be found in things not words; while in the Phaedrus he clearly proves that rhetoric is concerned not merely with law-courts and public assemblies, but with private and domestic affairs as well: from which it is obvious that this was the view of Plato himself.  Cicero also in a passage of one of his works, states that the material of rhetoric is composed of the things which are brought before it, but makes certain restrictions as to the nature of these things. In another passage, however, he expresses his opinion that the orator has to speak about all kinds of things; I will quote his actual words:  "although the very meaning of the name of orator and the fact that he professes to speak well seem to imply a promise and undertaking that the orator will speak with elegance and fullness on any subject that may be put before him."  And in another passage he says, "It is the duty of the true orator to seek out, hear, read, discuss, handle and ponder everything that befalls in the life of man, since it is with this that the orator is concerned and this that forms the material with which he had to deal."

    But this material, as we call it, that is to say the things brought before it, has been criticized by some, at times on the ground  that it is limitless, and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory, which they have therefore dubbed a discursive art, because all is grist that comes to its mill.  I have no serious quarrel with these critics, for they acknowledge that rhetoric is concerned with every kind of material , though they deny that it has any peculiar material just because of that material's multiplicity.  But in spite of this multiplicity, rhetoric is not unlimited in scope, and there are other minor arts whose material is characterized by the same multiplicity:  such for instance is architecture, which deals with everything that is useful for the purpose of building: such too is the engraver's art which works on gold, silver, bronze, iron.  As for sculpture, its activity extends to wood, ivory, marble, glass and [precious stones in addition to the materials already mentioned.  and things which form the material for other artists, do not for that reason cease forth with to be material for rhetoric.  For if I ask what is the material of the sculptor, I shall be told bronze; and if I ask what is the material of the maker of vessels... the answer will again be bronze: and yet there is all the difference in the world between vessels and statues.  Similarly medicine will not cease to be an art, because, like the art of the gymnast, it prescribes rubbing with oil and exercise, or because it deals with diet like the art of cookery.  

    Again, the objection that to discourse of what is good, expedient or just is the duty of philosophy presents no difficulty.  for when such critics speak of a philosopher, they mean a good man.  Why then should I feel surprised to find that the orator whom I identify with the good man deals with the same material?  There is all the less reason, since I have already shown in the first book that philosophers only usurped this department of knowledge after it had been abandoned by the orators: it was always the peculiar property of rhetoric and the philosophers are really trespassers.  Finally, since the discussion of whatever is brought before it is the task of dialectic, which is really a concise form of oratory, why should not this task be regarded as also being the appropriate material for continuous oratory?

    There is a further objection made by certain critics, who say "Well then, if an orator has to speak on every subject, he must be the master of all the arts." I might answer this criticism in the words of Cicero, in whom I find the following passage:- "In my opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts."  I however regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actually ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak.  For he cannot have a knowledge of all causes, and yet he should be able to speak on all.  On what then will he speak?  On those which he has studied.  Similarly as regards the arts, he will study those concerning which he has to speak, as occasion may demand, and will speak on those which he has studied.

    What then?--I am asked--will not a builder speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music?  Certainly, if the orator does not know what is the question at issue. Even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be. But on the other hand if the orator receive instructions from the builder or the musician, he will put forward what he has thus learned better than either, just as he will plead a case better than his client, once he has been instructed in it. The builder and the musician will, however, speak on the subject of their respective arts, if there should be any technical point which requires to be established. Neither will be an orator, but he will perform his task like an orator, just as when an untrained person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting like one. It is suggested that such topics  never crop up in panegyric, deliberative or forensic oratory? When the question of the construction of a port at Ostia came up for discussion, had not the orator to state his views? And yet it was a subject requiring the technical knowledge of the architect. Does not the orator discuss the question whether livid spots and swellings on the body are symptomatic of ill-health or poison? And yet that is a question for a qualified physician. Will he not deal with measurements and figures? And yet we must admit that they form part of mathematics. For my part I hold that practically all subjects are under certain circumstances liable to come up for treatment by the orator. If the circumstances do not occur, the subjects will not concern him.

    We were therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment, an assertion which is confirmed by the practice of everyday speech. For when we have been given a subject on which to speak, we often preface our remarks by calling attention to the fact that the matter has been laid before us. Gorgias indeed felt so strongly that it was the orator's duty to speak on every subject, that he used to allow those who attended his lectures to ask him questions on any subject they pleased. Hermagoras also asserted that the material of oratory lay in the cause and the questions it involved, thereby including every subject that can be brought before it. If he denies that general questions are the concern of oratory, he disagrees with me: but if they do concern rhetoric, that supports my contention. For there is nothing which may not crop up in a cause or appear as a question for discussion. Aristotle himself also by his tripartite division of oratory, into forensic, deliberative and demonstrative, practically brought everything into the orator's domain, since there is nothing that may not come up for treatment by one of these three kinds of rhetoric.

    A very few critics have raised the question as to what may be the instrument of oratory. My definition of an instrument is that without which the material cannot be brought into the shape necessary for the effecting of our object. But is not the art which requires an instrument, but the artist. knowledge needs no instruments, for it may be complete although it produces nothing, but the artist must have them. the engraver cannot work without his chisel nor the painter without his brush. I shall therefore defer this question until I come to treat of the orator as distinct from his art.