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Republic
6 (502c-511e)
The
Sun and the Divided Line
Contents:
The
Eidos of the Good (502c-509c)
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Socrates now raises the
level of the conversation.
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The philosopher who is
best to rule the city must not only know what justice is, for justice
is but one specific instance of the good.
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The greatest study of all
is the study of the idea ---The Form (Eidos) of the
good---Goodness Itself. (505a)
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Plato believes that
the good which is real (has being) as opposed to that which only
seems good is the Feature Itself ---The Form (Eidos) that is
Goodness Itself.
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Plato believes that
specific goods like justice, health, wisdom are good only to the
extent that they participate in the Form of Goodness Itself.
["When an object can be said to be F, it is by virtue of a
relation between it and the Form of F (see 475e-476d). This
relation, "participation" usually seems to hold between
sensible objects and Forms but it can perhaps also hold between
Forms too, e.g. between a Form and the Form of the Good."
Nicholas P. White. A Companion to Plato's Republic, p.
175.]
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The philosopher cannot
know whether a specific good (for example, a good law) is really
good or only apparently good, if she does not know what Goodness
itself is. No one is satisfied with the obtainment of the
seeming good; everyone seeks the genuine article.
-
Plato assumes that if
we do not know the entirely adequate definition of Goodness Itself
we cannot know (only opine) that some particular thing is good.
(Those who find this claim highly suspect call the claim the
Socratic fallacy).
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Since the ruler must
be able to know what is fine and good among the laws and practices
of the City, the ruler must seek knowledge of Goodness Itself.
-
Every aspect of the
tripartite soul is desirous of some particular Good or End. Each
of those particular goods are good in so far as they participate in
Goodness Itself (share the feature of goodness). Goodness Itself
then is the ultimate End of human life---the ultimate fulfillment of
all human desiring.
-
Human flourishing, the
achievement of excellence as a human being, is possible only when
the rational psyche apprehends the Form of the Good. Only
then can it provide itself with the object of its desire---the
true Good, and can recognize the Ends of fulfilling the goods of
the Spirited and appetitive souls as well. This commingling
and identification of the rational desire for the Good and the
object of knowledge: the Form of the Good, is a kind of secular
beatitude---a life fulfilling consummation.
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But what is The Good?
(508a-509c)
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Socrates must
distinguish the Form of the Good from the particular goods that
participate in it, for example: must distinguish between Goodness
Itself and the goodness of (some types) of pleasure or the
goodness of prudence.
-
Socrates claims not to
have knowledge of the Form of the Good.
-
However something that
is a child of the Good and looks like it can be described.
The
Analogy of the Sun
-
Socrates suggests that of
the many fine and good things, the feature that unites them is the
Idea of the Good. This one idea must be real, for otherwise
there would be no particular thing that would be good.
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Between the visible and
sight there must be a third thing which allows the visible to come out
of the darkness and be seen; and that third thing is light. The
god that supplies light is Apollo, the sun.*
-
*After the 5th Century
BC, Apollo, the son of Zeus and Leto, was identified with Helios,
the sun god. Phoebus Apollo, the god of light, was a moral
god concerned with prophecy, medicine, music, poetry, archery and
various bucolic arts. He was responsible for law, philosophy and
the arts. He, along with Athena, was a patron god of Athens
and his Oracle at his shrine in Delphi inspired Socrates to carry
out his sacred mission of exposing intellectual fraud wherever he
found it.
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Just as the sun provides
the light that makes the eye aware of color and the colored thing
visible, so too The Good provides the idea (enlightenment) that allows
the rational mind to know the Forms of things. The Good is that
whereby we grasp the universal and eternal Features (eide) of
particular things.
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Just as the sun, through
the emanation of its heat energy and light causes the generation of
living things, so too the Good causes the being of the things it makes
knowable.
-
Just as the sun causes
generation but is not itself generation (is eternally beyond
generation or corruption), so too The Good is not itself a being like
those it causes, is not itself a thing, but is beyond beings.
Interpretation
of the Analogy of the Sun
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What is this all about?
This passage is perhaps one of the most obscure and mysterious in all
of Plato's writings. Plato is offering his cryptic answer to
life's most fundamental mystery: why reality?---why is there
anything at all?---nothingness would have been so much simpler.
The analogy with the sun god suggests that Plato's explanation for the
universe is a move beyond polytheism to a monotheism. However,
the transcendent source of all the beings and all of the forms is not
a personal god. It is a real, transcendent, eternal, unchanging,
universal source of existence; but Goodness Itself has no personality
(although Glaucon thinks Socrates owes us a narrative on the
Father of the sun-god, and Socrates described Apollo as the
"child" of the Good.) That the Form of the Good is the
ultimate cause of the Forms makes sense in light of the fact that: 1.
Forms make things what they are and thus are the origin of beings, 2.
Forms are universal, permanent, eternal and thus more real (and real
making) than particular things which are fleeting, changing, hovering
between being and non-being. 2. Forms are united by the
Good---when we apprehend an apple, we understand it as participating
in the universal and eternal Form (Idea) of Appleness Itself---Appleness
itself is ideal, it is perfection without flaws, without corruption.
Thus the Good in the apple, Ideal Appleness, allows us to know the
thing as an apple.
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Goodness Itself is a good
candidate for ultimate reality since it unites all the Forms of things
and the apprehension of the good in things is the same as grasping the
thing in its essence, making it known to us.
Why
is the Good the most important study of the lover of wisdom?
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Reason will not achieve
its End---absolute knowledge of the totality of being--- unless it has
an appetite (eros) of its own. The Faustian quest for complete
and absolute knowledge must be driven by a yearning. Since every
yearning has its proper object, the ultimate cause of reality (which
is mysteriously beyond reality, that is, beyond particular beings)
must be an object of intellectual desire. So ultimate Being must
also be ultimate Good, the End of all desiring. The consummation
of human life is in knowledge of Goodness Itself.
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(All of this is a
mistake. It's the mistake of misplaced concretion.
Goodness is a feature or a characterization of things. As
such it cannot be attributed to the mysterious cause of things.
That cause cannot be known in its own nature (if it's indeed an
"it" or has a nature). Any easy ascription of the
features of things to it is a falsification of it. Being is
that whereby or in accord with which things are, but ontic
descriptions are fallen that is, they're false descriptions
derived from features of things and cannot thereby be legitimately
ascribed to Being itself.)
The
Divided Line (509d-511e)
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Once Socrates has divided
up the visible natural world (sun lit) and the intelligible invisible
world of the Forms (Good sent), he further illustrates the venture of
the philosopher's life with the Divided Line.
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A line A-E is divided in
unequal measures: AC-CE. Then each section is divided by an
equal amount so that the following proportions are produced: [AB:BC::CD:DE]::AC:CE
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AC represents the visible
world and includes the categories of visible thing CB and the images
and shadows AB that emanate from them. CE represents the
intellected world of the Forms including the categories of
mathematical entities and scientific Forms (Natures) CD and the Higher
Forms of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, Moderation and the Form of the Good
DE.
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The line suggests two
progressions, one epistemological, another metaphysical.
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Epistemological
progression: Starting with the minimal evidence of images
and first impressions, the young Guardian gains a tenuous grasp of
reality through the images of Homer and Hesiod, the poetic content of
musical education. Ordinary perception of the changing
particulars (trees, flowers, Spartans, the agora) provides
acquaintance with their universal essences without a full grasping or
understanding of them. A child may perceive clearly the flowers
in the garden she is skipping through, without a botanist's
understanding of what is there. The child's awareness is one of
opinion not knowledge
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Only on the
intellectual level of CD, apprehension of the Forms of mathematics
and scientific natures can the Guardian student obtain knowledge.
A circle is an enclosed arc every point along which is equidistant
from a central point. This essence of Circleness applies to
the quadrillions of particular circles and wheels that participate
in it. This essence of Circle is eternal, universal, and
unchanging. These Forms (e.g. of the Isosceles triangle) are
imperceptible (because they are ideal, universal and eternal) and
thus only apprehended by reason alone. [A visible line is
not really a mathematical line, because as the shortest distance
between two points, the line has no width. Mathematical
points have no dimensions at all, and so cannot be apprehended by
the senses]
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Finally, ultimate
knowledge is knowledge of Forms which are matters of pure
intellection, reasoning not from hypotheses, as in the case of the
scientific generalizations from particular observations or from
the use of visual illustration as in the case of geometrical
proofs, but rather purely from the use of reason alone, e.g.
understanding the Form of the Good. Understanding the Higher
Forms results from the method of the dialectic which discovers
first principles from which conclusions about particulars are
deduced.
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In terms of the
progression of knowledge, Plato is saying that knowledge of the
higher Forms is comparable to knowledge derived from Math and
Science as knowledge of visible things is to knowledge derived
from images and shadows, as knowledge of intellectual Forms is to
the opinions derived from perception and imagination.
Knowing the Form of the Good then makes knowledge of anything else
possible, whereas opinion formed and restricted to political
propaganda, popular media and societal conventions guarantees
ignorance of the true, the real and the good.
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Metaphysically the
line represents a progression from the most ephemeral, changing,
multiple unstable and particular to the more enduring, unified,
eternal , universal, stable, permanent and ideal. So from the
unreality and derivative nature of shadows, we progress up the scale
of reality to the eternal source of being, the Form of the Good. Math
and natural Forms are as real compared to the Higher Forms, as shadows
are to perceived things as the entities dwelling in the world of
opinion are to the intellected Forms in the World of Knowledge.
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The philosopher grasps
this great chain of being and accepts the unconventional notion that
ideal Forms are real and perceived particulars are not (as real).
Because of her knowledge of the true Good, only the philosopher
can apprehend the fine and the good in the laws and practices of the
City.
Suggestions for Further Reading
- Annas, Julia. "Understanding
and the Good: Sun, Line and Cave." Plato's
Republic: Critical Essays. Ed. Richard Kraut.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. [143-168]
- Benardette, Seth. Socrates'
Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic. Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1989.
- Bloom, Allan. The Republic of
Plato. New York: Harper Collins, 1968. [139-157]
- Irwin, Terence. Plato's Ethics.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. [271-274]
- Pappas, Nickolas. Plato
and the Republic. New York: Routlege, 1995. [114-117]
- Sallis, John. Being and Logos:
Reading the Platonic Dialogues. 3rd ed. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana Univeristy Press, 1996. [396-412]
- White, Nicholas P. A
Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979.
[163-182]
Department
of Philosophy | Sophia
Project | Plato
Page
© 2000, S. Mayo
For more information contact: smayo@molloy.edu
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