Republic 4 (427d-445b)

Justice in the City and Individual

 


Contents:


Justice in the City  (427d-434d)

  • Socrates now asks the founder of this "City in Speech", Glaucon, and all the others, where the justice in it resides.

    • They assert that the city is perfectly good. 

    • For it to be perfectly good, it must be wise, courageous, moderate and just.

    • Because it is assumed that there are no other virtues or excellences for a city to have, it is believed that if the wisdom, courage and moderation of the city are defined then by process of elimination and by highlighting these three virtues, justice will stand out in contrast.*

*This notion derives from the Platonic theory of the unity of the virtues, that is, that the four virtues are so interrelated that a deficiency in one will imply a deficiency in or erosion of the others, and true virtue entails accomplishment in all four virtues.

  • The city is wise by virtue of a small part of it, that is, by the counsel of the Guardian Rulers. 

    • Although artisans and craftpersons know many things their knowledge is restricted to the telos of their specialized craft.

    • Statescraft, by contrast, requires knowledge of the whole city and its relation to other cities.  This knowledge is found exclusively in the Guardian Rulers.

      • We learn in Book  VII, 521c-541b , the extensive nature of the broad liberal arts education proposed for Rulers:  music, gymnastics, mathematics, science [including medicine and astronomy], literature and history.  If qualifying exams are passed, at the age of thirty, Auxiliary Guardians study philosophy and the dialectic for five years. They then enter positions of high command in the military for fifteen years of service.  Observed in the field for courage, wisdom in the conduct of battle, for leadership abilities, for moderation and justice in the treatment of the defeated, Auxiliaries can be tapped at the age of fifty for Guardian Rule. Plato is confidant that no-one could mask corruption or incompetence after such a career.

  • The City is courageous because of its sterling Auxiliary Guardians.

    • By virtue of the education the Guardians receive in music and gymnastics, they learn what is truly terrible and what is not.  Thus they are able to defend the life, honor and glory of the city without cowardice or resort to excessive violence.  They combine in themselves both viciousness and gentleness. Their disciplined education prevents them from raping, rampaging or pillaging subdued enemy peoples.  They are disposed to change their former enemy into an ally. Their courage then comes from their character, their disposition to defend the laws and not from their ability to wreck havoc.  "These colors won't run."

  • The city is moderate in a systemic way

    • Moderation does not reside exclusively or even predominantly in the artisan class.  We know from Book II, that Socrates reluctantly accepted Glaucon's aspiration to found the "Feverish City," one dedicated to the pursuit of the unnecessary desires, namely luxuries.  The artisans, far from living in moderation,are part of a feverish capitalist economy and their avocation is the amassment of wealth and acquisitions.  Plato holds them in contempt as people who sadly do not desire what is the most humanly desirable and also for not knowing what they really want (as opposed to the Auxiliaries and the Rulers).  Unbridled acquisitiveness and hedonism would have torn the city apart.  And that's why the desires of the artisan class have to be externally curbed by the impositions of Rulers, enforced by Auxiliaries.

    • Moderation in the ideal city comes from the recognition of every class in the society that the basest, worst and most out of control part of the society should be ruled by the better, most knowledgeable, prudent and reasonable part.  Indoctrinated by the Noble Lie, the artisan class accepts the legitimacy of the Guardians to rule.  They accept the prohibition against revolution or popular usurpation of power because they accept the acquired wisdom of the Guardian class as its natural trait (a lie)..  Moreover, there is no envy on the part of the populace for the ruling class because: 1. private ownership is guaranteed them by the rulers, and 2. their rulers subsist on a far more austere standard of living then they and  serve them without compensation of salary or property. The City is moderate because rulers keep their hands off the people's money and the people keep their hands off the rulers.

    • Auxiliaries also play their part in the city's moderation because they willingly serve as the enforcement arm of the rulers without desiring to usurp the government. Further they are willing to defend and serve the citizens instead of abusing them and extracting tribute from the citizens.  (Plato knows well that the fear inspired by warriors can give them the effect of the Ring of Gyges, hiding the extortion of the citizens behind a wall of silence.)

  • Now they are ready to flush out justice

    • Socrates says (with considerable surprise) that justice has been right at hand all along in the discussion.  From his discussion with Adeimantus and the Healthy City in Book II, he extracts the principle of specialization:  a person should do one function in the city and one for which s/he is particularly suited.

      •  A corollary of that principle is that a person shouldn't try to do somebody else's job or to interfere with that person when they try to do their job.

  • This then is justice in the city:  Each class does the job for which it is best suited and no one class should meddle with the task of the other.

    • Justice is giving and allowing each class to do what is its own.  When this occurs there is a harmony in the city.  Rulers rule, Auxiliary Guardians Guard, and Producers produce. The result is full productivity and employment with all the basic goods and luxuries provided; a City that is well-defended, honorable and glorious; and one in which the rulers rule in the interests and to the advantage of the citizens.

    • Socrates thinks that if a shoemaker wants to do a bit of carpentry this would not shatter the harmony of the city.  But if a money-maker enters the class of rulers and starts to use government as a means to personal enrichment or if he enters into the military (replacing the profit motive for the defense motive), then there is political hell to pay.  [Eisenhower warned against the military-industrial complex.] Also if a general or admiral took over the government and subverted the commercial sector to military purposes, the city would be lost.

      • We too should recognize the distinct functions of public policy making, military defense and private enterprise and realize the damage that superimposing the goals of one function on the other can cause.  What offends the modern mind is the undemocratic exclusion of whole classes from government.  We accept this when it comes to the military, but not when it comes to the private sector.  Plato is caught  up in his rigid analogy of the State as having the same structure as the human psyche. The artisans are likened to the appetitive function of the soul.  We might find it plausible that the rational soul should lord it over the baser appetites, but that this is analogous with the rulers' duty to lord it over the artisans escapes us.  Plato's own psychology has it that the artisans are endowed with Reason and Spirit, as well as Appetite.  More enlightened philosophers used this as a defense for universal suffrage and right of the people to govern itself.  In my view, Plato harbors an aristocratic contempt for the common man.  In his opinion the artisan could fulfill his intellect and control his appetites but he is unlikely to do so; and it is this contempt that underlies his authoritarian and undemocratic meritocracy.  In an era before the founding of universities and the scarcity of leisure time for scholarly pursuits, it is perhaps understandable why Plato had this prejudice; but it is not forgivable.

 The Three Parts of the Soul  (434d-441c)

  • Plato now makes the comparison between the Form of the City and the Form of the human being.  We are to imagine ourselves to be complex "cities" and the crucial question is: "who's in charge?"  How well are you governing this "city," that is, your self?

  • The first task is to see if there are comparable factors of the soul (psyche) that are analogous to the Tripartite classes of the polis:  Guardian Rulers, Auxiliary Guardians, Producers. 

  • The human soul is complex rather than simple because different aspects of it desire different Ends.

    • DESIRE:  

      • The Appetitive aspect of soul desires sensual satisfaction, for example, for food, drink and sex.

      • The appetites seek not some specific end, for example: Sam Adams Summer Ale, but rather a generic goal: anything quench-worthy.  (This distinguishes the appetites from the rational soul.)

      • Socrates finds in the soul conflicting tensions: one in the direction of satisfying the appetite, the other in the direction of frustrating the appetite.

    • REASON

      • The latter is the calculating part of the soul:  the rational soul.  There can be found in the same person the irrational desire to drink and the rational resistance to drink because of the bad consequences of drinking. (An example would be the offer to a starving man of a cake the starving man knows to be poisoned.  The persistent desire on the part of the appetite, in contrast to the rational part which resists it at all costs, shows the separation of these aspects of the psyche.)

    • SPIRIT

      • Finally, the fact that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites reveals the third part of the tripartite soul:  the spirited soul (anger, assertion, aggression).

    • Interaction:

      • When desire pushes a person toward an object that  reason rejects as choice-worthy, reason often enlists anger to rail against and subdue the appetitive force.

      • Once spirit vows allegiance to reason, and reason sees the worth of a political cause, any frustrations of the appetites will be accepted without anger:  Spirit will docilely obey reason's dictates despite hardship.

      • But if reason perceives itself unjustly wronged., spirit will rear up in its defense, and appetites will be subdued even unto death for a just cause.

 Justice in the Individual  (441c-445b)

  • And so the Form of the Soul is seen to have the same Form as the City.  Virtue will be found in the soul in the same manner as it is found in the City.

    • Justice in the city was found in the willingness of each class to do what it is naturally suited to do, while not interfering with the business of the other classes:  Rulers rule, Auxiliary Guardians guard and Producers produce.

  • In the just person, each part of the complex soul does what it is natural for it to do without unduly interfering with the functions of the other souls.

    • Thus the reasoning or calculating part rules over the appetitive and spirited parts.

    • Spirited anger or aggression allies itself with Reason and springs to its defense.

    • If the appetitive or spirited souls attempt to usurp and enslave reason, disaster results.

  • Only justice among the souls, wherein each is allowed to pursue what is its own, can all human goals be effectively obtained.

    • Thus only a wise, courageous, just and moderate soul can achieve eudaimonia, full human flourishment, happiness.

  • Now they test this theory of justice as psychic harmony against the conventional opinions about justice, that is, against the popular notion that justice is honoring parents and making acts of piety toward gods, avoiding stealing, lying, and betraying or committing acts of  adultery.

    • They see immediately that the eudaimon, the psychically harmonized person, is the least likely to break any of the conventional norms associated with justice.

    • This is the triumph of an ethic of virtue over rule-based ethics.  The psychically harmonized person is the least likely to injure or violate another person for they have all that they need for happiness in their own noble character.

    • Making an analogy between virtue and health, Socrates asserts that psychic harmony is in accord with nature; but if passion overwhelms reason or spirited aggression usurps reason, such injustice between souls is as unnatural and as damaging as disease is to the body.

Conclusion

  • It should be pointed out that Plato has answered all the questions posed in Books I and II.  Justice has been defined both in the City and in the person.  Further, whether justice is advantageous in itself ( an intrinsic value) and not only as a means to other goods has been demonstrated in the model of the eudaimon, the fully flourishing, psychically harmonized person (It is never an advantage to be out of sorts spiritually).

  • The argument for the advantage of the just life, however, is thoroughly accomplished in Books VII through IX, where Socrates compares various forms of cities and personalities in contrast with the Ideal State and individual.  This is completed only after the digression on women, marriage and the philosopher king in Books V, VI and VII.

    Suggestions for Further Reading

  • Annas, Julia. An Introduction to Plato's Republic New York:  Oxford UP, 1981.  [109-152]
  • Cooper, John M.  "The Psychology of Justice in Plato."  Plato's Republic: Critical Essays.  Ed.  Richard Kraut.  Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.
  • Benardette, Seth.  Socrates' Second Sailing:  On Plato's Republic.  Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989.  [78-105]
  • Bloom, Allan.  The Republic of Plato.  New York: Harper Collins, 1968.   [369-379]
  • Irwin, Terence.  Plato's Ethics.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995.  [223-243]
  • Pappas, Nickolas.  Plato and the Republic.  New York: Routlege, 1995.   [81-98]
  • Robinson, R.  "Plato's Separation of Reason From Desire." Phronesis 16 (1971): 38-48.
  • Sallis, John. Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues.  3rd ed.  Bloomington, IN:  Indiana Univeristy Press, 1996.  [361-371]
  • White,  Nicholas P.  A Companion to Plato's Republic.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979.  [106-138]
  • Wilson, J.  "The Argument of Republic 4." Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1976): 111-124

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