Republic 2 (357a-367e)

The Immoralist Position Restated

Contents:

• Introduction

• Glaucons' Challenge (357a-362d)

• Adeimantus' Challenge (362d-367e)

• Suggestions for Further Reading

Introduction

• At the end of Book 1 Socrates has forced Thrasymachus to give up the debate on justice.  This debate, however, is not over just yet.  Unsatisfied with the way Socrates has defeated Thrasymachus, the brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus, press Socrates to elaborate further on the topic of Justice.  

• It should be pointed out that we not meant to assume that Glaucon and Adeimantus agree with Thrasymachus' position.  What they are trying to do is to compel Socrates to offer a more satisfactory response to Thrasymachus' arguments.  In a sense, they are playing "devil's advocate" to Socrates, taking up Thrasymachus' position in order to provide Socrates with the opportunity to present a more complete account of justice.  The rest of the Republic represents Socrates attempt to offer such an account and to prove that the life of justice is indeed "in every way better" than the life of injustice (357a).

 Glaucons' Challenge:  Is Justice Good in Itself?   (357a-362d)

• Glaucon begins his challenge by positing 3 different types of good things  (357b-358a).  All good things he argues are desirable for one of the following reasons:

1. for their own sake, but not for their consequences  (i.e., harmless pleasures)

2. for their consequences, but not for their own sake   (i.e., medicine or money)

3. for their own sake and for their consequences (i.e., knowledge or health)

• Glaucon then proceeds to ask Socrates where Justice fits into this scheme.  

1. According to the first position, justice would be seen to be valuable in itself and regardless of its consequences. One would choose to be just then even if the consequences of being just would lead to suffering or misery  [the deontological position]

2. According to the second position, justice would seem as a good only because behaving justly produces good consequences (i.e., respect from other members of the community); but justice wouldn't be recognized as a good in itself.  [the utilitarian position]

3. Socrates' own position will be that justice belongs to the third class of good: something desirable for its own sake as well as for its consequence (358a)   [the platonic position]

• Glaucon responds to the first part of Socrates claim (that justice is desirable for its own sake) with an argument aimed at demonstrating that injustice is ultimately more preferable in itself than justice is.  He argues this point with the famous story of the Ring of Gyges (358a-360d)
  • The rules of justice, he maintains, arise out of convention—that is out of an agreement made by members of society. Because human beings are afraid of being harmed by others, they create laws, and punish those who violate them.  
  • Assuming a person could avoid the threat of punishment  (the magic ring), he would certainly opt to behave unjustly (violate the queen, kill the king and usurp the throne).  
  • Therefore, nobody desires justice for its own sake, but only for its consequences.  Human beings behave justly, in other words, not because they prefer justice to injustice, but simply because they fear the consequence of behaving unjustly.   
• Glaucon reinforces his point by asking Socrates to compare the life of the perfectly just man and the perfectly unjust man.  (360e-362d) Who is better off he asks: 
  • The perfectly just man who is defamed, poor and lives a life filled with suffering
  • or the perfectly unjust man who is wealthy, famous, respected and powerful?
• Glaucon's point:  
  • If justice was desirable in itself, then we would choose it, regardless of its consequences
  • But no one would choose a life of justice if the consequences were as bleak as Glaucon portrays them
  • Therefore, nobody desires justice for its own sake, but only for its consequences.

 Adeimantus' Challenge:  Does Justice Produce Desirable Consequences?  (362d-367e)

• Whereas Glaucon argues that justice is not desirable in itself,  Adeimantus' aim is to demonstrate that it is not desirable for its consequences either.
  • Adiemantus argues that parents don't teach children to be just because justice is good in itself, but because of its consequences.  
  • They claim that the just person receives many benefits:  good marriage, public office, reputation, and rewards in the next life.
  • But this doesn't seem to be the case.  In this life, many good people suffer, and the wicked prosper.  The wicked also have the opportunity to make up for their sins before they die, thus receiving rewards in the next life as well.
  • Therefore injustice is actually more profitable than justice is.
• What the two brothers are doing is challenging Socrates' claim that justice is valuable in itself and for its consequences.  By the time Glaucon and Adeimantus finish their attacks, Socrates is presented with a more viable defense of Thrasymachus' original position that justice is worthless.
• The burden will be placed upon him, then, to demonstrate the truth of his original claim that the life is justice is preferable to the life of injustice.

    Suggestions for Further Reading

• Annas, Julia.  An Introduction to Plato's Republic.  New York:  Oxford, 1981 [58-94]
• Bloom, Allan.  The Republic of Plato.  New York: Harper Collins, 1968.  [337-351]
• Irwin, Terence.  Plato's Ethics.  New York: Oxford UP, 1995.  [181-202] 
• Kirwin, C.  "Glaucon's Challenge," Phronesis 10 (1965): 162-173.
• Pappas, Nickolas.  Plato and the Republic.  New York: Routlege, 1995.    [51-70]
• Rice, Daryl H.   A Guide to Plato's Republic.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.  [35-52]
• Taylor, A.E.  Plato: The Man and His Work.  Cleveland: Meridian, 1964.  [270-273]
• White,  Nicholas P.  A Companion to Plato's Republic.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979.  [74-94]

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