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Republic
1 (336b-354c)
Thrasymachus:
The Immoralist Position
Contents:
Introduction
- The text of the Republic begins
with Socrates interrogating Cephalus and his son Polemachus about the
nature of justice. Neither is capable of providing Socrates with
an adequate definition of justice. Just when we begin to think
that there is no one in the dialogue who is capable of adequately
standing up to Socrates, along comes Thrasymachus.
- Who is this Thrasymachus guy anyway?
- He is a well-known Sophist, a
teacher of Rhetoric. Rhetoric is the art and science of
persuasion, and since oratory was extremely useful in negotiating
trade opportunities or for suing or defending oneself before the
juries in Democratic Athens, rhetoric was a sought-after skill.
Socrates’ own students went on to make great fortunes, which was
something Xanthippe, his wife, resented because Socrates took no
fees for his instruction.
- He distinguished philosophy from
sophistry because the philosopher sacrificed everything, including
eloquence, for the truth, whereas, he charged, the sophist
sacrificed the truth for eloquence and for persuasive
effectiveness. This charge is often leveled against the legal and
the advertising professions (both involved in persuasion) and
sophistry has a negative connotation today.
- Thrasymachus presents himself as
annoyed with the give and take inconclusiveness of the dialogue
between Socrates and Polemarchus. He demands an answer from
Socrates and a grandiloquently persuasive speech in favor of the
answer.
Justice as the Advantage of the
Strongest (336b-343a)
- Socrates turns over the floor to
Thrasymachus who professes that justice is the advantage of the
strongest. (338c)
- By this he means that from place to
place different political regimes rule: tyranny, aristocracy,
democracy, for example. Whomever is in power (the strongest )
makes the laws and invariably they make the laws to their own
financial and political advantage. Thus just rulers rule to the
benefit of the strongest, namely themselves.
- Socrates counters that Statecraft or
rule is like any other craft and the practitioners of any craft
conduct that craft in the interest of and to the benefit of the
weakest, namely their clients or customers.
- Physicians rule over and have
authority over medicine. Between the physician and the patient,
the physician is the stronger, since she has expertise and is not
sick and the patient is the weaker, since both ignorant and sick.
But the telos of the physician is to dispense medicine and the
good of the art is the cure. The benefit, however, goes to the
weaker since the patient is cured, not the physician. So in
medicine the authority rules for the benefit of the weaker.
- So too, if Statecraft is a craft,
what is proper for the ruler is to act in the interest and to the
advantage of the weakest, namely the citizens. Out of the need and
the desire of the people for law and order, coordination and
leadership, so that they might achieve the telos of their specific
crafts, the ruler emerges with the expertise, strength and
authority to act in the interests of each and every citizen. If
rule is like any craft, then this is ideal rule. Justice is rule
in the interest of the citizens.
- Thrasymachus then proceeds to insult
Socrates, claiming that Socrates’ wet-nurse never taught him the
difference between a shepherd and a sheep. Shepherds watch their
flocks not for the sake of the sheep, but so the sheep can be fleeced
and slaughtered for his profit.
- So too, the relation of Ruler and
citizens is that of shepherd and sheep. The citizens are like
sheep to be fleeced and slaughtered for the benefit and profit of
the ruler.
- Socrates counters by dividing the crafts
of the profit-maker from that of other craftpersons like the
physician. The craft of profit-making is indeed self-interested. But
that craft must not be confused with that of the physician. The
physician is a physician only if she cures patients. The benefit goes
to the patient. Indeed the physician would only be paid, if she
effectively cured patients, that is, only if she achieved the
advantage of the weakest.
- Similarly, the shepherd as shepherd
must seek the advantage of the sheep¾ must watch them carefully,
keep them from wolves, search for the stray and bring it back to
the fold. If and only if the shepherd is a good shepherd does he
deserve his pay.
- Thus the just ruler is to be
compensated only if none of the advantage of the rule goes to him
and all of the ruling efforts are to the advantage of the people.
(Socrates need not point out that the patients or citizens have
higher values than sheep.)
- Socrates asks if Rulers rule ambitiously
or reluctantly.
- Thrasymachus, contemplating the
spoils of tyranny, suggests that rulers rule avidly. Socrates, in
keeping with his notion of just rule, suggests that since none of
the advantage of rule goes to the rulers, people would have to be
given incentives to take on the burden of the public trust.
- However, the best rulers would be
those who find the incentives of pay or honors distasteful. The
best could be enticed to rule only to avoid the penalty of being
ruled by people who are worse than they, that is, to avoid being
ruled by unjust people, people who are worse in character than
they.
Justice as Another's Good (343b-344d)
- At this point, Thrasymachus drops the
pretense of seeking to define justice, and now claims that, although
justice is virtuous and beneficial to others, no intelligent person
would adopt it because of the superior advantages of the unjust life,
especially in the political arena. This position is called "immoralism,"
the forthright defense of immorality as the most prudent course for a
life to take.
- Thrasymachus, in a speech
demonstrative of his rhetorical prowess, praises the tyrant who is
unjust in a grand way. Such a man will pay far fewer taxes that
the just man, receive far more benefits from contracts that the
honest dupes who enter into them with him and will profit from
influence peddling and the lavish gifts he is able to provide to
his family and to the gods in the form of burnt offerings. Yes,
the unjust man is the happiest of men.
Socrates: Final Objections (344d-354c)
- Socrates, telling Thrasymachus that he
has challenged the whole conduct of living, takes up a defense of the
just life:
- The just man does not try to get the
better of other just men, but rather of unjust men who are his
opposites in character.
- Unjust men try to get the better
of both just and unjust men. [The aggregate consequence of
this feature of criminality is used by Robert Axelrod to
demonstrate why, over-time, just people (in aggregate) have
higher standards of living than unjust people. See The
Evolution of Cooperation. NY: Basic Books, 1984]
- The just person then follows the
pattern of all craftpersons. The excellent craftperson does
not try to take advantage of those who are members of his or
her craft or guild but tries only to excel over amateurs.
Thrasymachus is embarrassed to find himself agreeing that
justice is a human virtue. In fact, the just person’s
reluctance to cheat or dissemble and her/his willingness to
cooperate with mentors, allows the just person to achieve
excellence in a chosen craft; whereas the consistent cheater
wallows in ignorance and can only pretend at mastery. [This is
why academic honesty is important¾and not just in your major!
Remember all of life is a craft!]
- Against Thrasymachus’s contention
that the most powerful city will be the most completely unjust.
Socrates argues that any common course of action requires those
who are engaged in it to observe justice to some degree in their
dealings among themselves, for otherwise there will be dissension
among them and they will accomplish nothing.
- Only the just cooperate, and
only those who cooperate accomplish anything. Even to pull off
a bank robbery, thieves must cooperate. There must be honor
among thieves. But thieves tear down the accomplishments of
others; and rival gangs of thieves tear each other down. Only
those who are both honest and cooperate produce the
accomplishments that are ample and long lasting.*
- "For surely Thrasymachus,
it’s injustice that produces factions, hatreds, and quarrels
among themselves, and justice that produces unanimity and
friendship. Isn’t it so?" (Book I, 251 d.)
- Unjust rulers will rule a city
that is unjust to its allies and neighboring nations. These
will seek advantage over the citizens who will form factions;
then intrigue and civil war will prevent the city from
accomplishing anything. The unjust ruler will be deceitful and
calculating with his closest advisors. They will turn on each
other. Even within a person, when discord breaks out between
one’s passions and one’s practical reason, a person won’t
stick to his or her craft and s/he won’t be able to act
productively; s/he will accomplish nothing. Thus
injustice is not mighty in a productive sense; it is mightily
destructive. It undermines all collective enterprises, all
friendship and partnerships; and injustice within a
person¾that is, when reason is overcome by passions such as
lust, greed, or hatred¾leads to a situation in which the
person is either unable to accomplish anything or is
destroyed.
- Since Thrasymachus has admitted that
justice is virtue, Socrates uses that admission to crown his
argument.
- A virtue is the specific
excellence of a craft. It is the power to achieve the purpose
or goal of a craft, its telos. Justice is the virtue (arete of
the craft of life. The human soul has the goal or telos of
flourishing life and the management of things. The arete or
virtue of justice is the specific excellence of the human
soul; it is that which allows each life to flourish, to manage
well oneself and social life. Justice allows practical reason
to guide human aptitudes and passions. It allows us to remain
loyal and faithful to friends. It allows us to keep the public
promises we make as craftpersons and professionals to provide
a service or product to our customers and clients. A city with
just rulers who serve in the interests of the citizens and a
city that keeps faith with its allies accomplishes greatness
as a city.
- The human soul cannot flourish
without justice any more than the body can flourish without
health. Thus a person cannot be happy without justice.
The unjust person will be wretched (the opposite of
flourishing humanity, perhaps "withered," lacking
maturity," "unruly"). It is not profitable to
be wretched, or to become wretched as a human being; but it is
profitable to be happy. Therefore, injustice is never more
profitable than justice.
Conclusion
- Socrates is pleased that Thrasymachus
has been tamed and quieted by his arguments, but ultimately he has to
admit dissatisfaction with the discussion. In his zeal to defend the
advantages of the just life, he plumb forgot to find a definition for
justice. How can he recommend the just life, if doesn’t know what
justice is? So ends, inconclusively, Book I of The
Republic.
Suggestions for Further Reading
-
Annas,
Julia. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. New
York: Oxford, 1981. [16-58]
-
Bernadete,
Seth. Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic.
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1989. [9-32].
-
Bloom,
Allan. The Republic of Plato. New York: Harper
Collins, 1968. [310-337]
-
Devin,
Stauffen. Plato's Introduction to the Question of Justice.
Albany: State University of New York, 2001.
-
Irwin,
Terence. Plato's Ethics. New York: Oxford UP,
1995. [169-180]
-
Lycos,
K. Plato on Justice and Power. Alabany: State University
of New York, 1987.
-
Pappas,
Nickolas. Plato and the Republic. New York:
Routledge, 1995. [27-50]
-
Reeve,
C.D.C. Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988. [3-42]
-
Sallis,
John. Being and Logos: Reading Platonic Dialogues.
3rd ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1996. [312-346]
-
Sparshott,
F. E., "Socrates and Thrasymachus." Monist 50
(1966): 421-459.
-
Taylor,
A.E. Plato: The Man and Hos Work. New York:
Meridian, 1964. [265-270]
-
Tiles,
J. E. "Techne and Moral Expertise." Philosophy
59 (1984): 49-66.
-
White,
Nicholas P. A Companion to Plato's Republic.
Indianapolis, Hackett, 1979. [61-73]
Department
of Philosophy | Sophia
Project | Plato
Page
© 2000, S. Mayo
For more information contact: smayo@molloy.edu
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