On Rhetoric 2.2-11

"Pathos"

Commentary

CONTENTS:

• Review of the Means of Persuasion  (2.1)

• Pathos (2.2-11)

  • Introduction

  • Specific Emotions

• Suggestions for Further Reading

Review of the Means of Persuasion (2.1)

• We have already seen in Book I that Aristotle identifies three means of persuasion (pisteis) that a rhetoric must keep in mind when addressing an audience

1. that which is derived when the speaker's character (ethos) is presented in a  favorable light.

2. that which is derived from awakening emotion (pathos) in an audience.

3. that which is derived from the logic of the speaker's argument (logos).

• In Book II Aristotle will go into greater detail on each of these means of persuasion.  It is important to note that although Aristotle probably sympathizes with Plato's attempt to ground persuasion in logical argumentation, he is perceptive enough to realize that the average person usually isn't persuaded by arguments alone.  It is for this reason that the rhetor needs to have a firm understanding of how to use his own character and the emotions of the audience as means of persuasion as well.

Pathos (2.2-11)

I.  Introduction

1.  Importance

Aristotle's treatment of the emotions in the Rhetoric is considered one of the "earliest systematic discussions of human psychology."   His discussion of the emotions is still quite relevant today, and his analysis can provide a the potential rhetor with much useful information about human motivation  (Kennedy 122).

2.  What are they?

"Emotions  in Aristotle's sense are moods, temporary states of mind---not attributes of character or natural desires---and arise in large part from perception of what is publicly due to or from oneself at a given time.  As such, they effect judgments"  (Kennedy 124).  The clever speaker, therefore, can alter the psychological state of members of his audience by arousing specific emotions in them, and, thus effect their judgments.

3.  Aims of Rhetor in Arousing Emotions

The aim of the rhetor, according to Aristotle, is (1) to aroused these emotion in an audience in order to effectively secure the judgment that he desires from them and (2) to be able to arouse negative emotions (e.g., shamelessness, enmity, and envy) against one's enemies.

 

4.  What we need to know about the emotion in order to persuade (2.1):

 

a) the nature (definition) of the particular emotion

• what is the sate of mind of  the person who feels the emotion?

b) the object of the emotion

• towards whom or what is the emotion felt?

c) cause of the emotion

•  why is the emotion felt and in what circumstances is it felt?

II.  Specific Emotions

 

1.  Anger (2.2)

 

a)  definition:   strong desire for revenge caused by the belittlement of  ourselves or those we love.   This belittle must be uncalled for  (e.g., undeserved)

 

b)  object = felt towards that particular individual (or group) that has caused us harm

 

c) cause =  some manifestation of  belittlement---  e.g.:

1) contempt:  felt towards those who are viewed as unimportant.

2) spite:  involves thwarting another's wishes, not to get something for oneself but to prevent him from having it.

3) insult:  involves saying or doing things to sham one's victim not because of anything he may have done to you, but simply for the pleasure involved.

 

2.  Calmness  (2.3)

 

a) definition:  the settling down and quieting of anger.  Therefore, calm is the opposite state of anger.

 

b) object = 

•  felt towards those who do not belittle us (i.e., who respect us)

•  or who have done so involuntarily

•  or who are sorry for what they have done, etc.

c) cause =

• when we feel prosperous, successful, satisfied, free from pain

• when our anger has cooled or has been spent (i.e., directed elsewhere)

• when the wrongdoer has been punished (or has adequately suffered)

• or when we feel that we are deserving of belittlement

3.  Friendly Feeling  (2.4)

a) definition:  wishing some good for the other, not for one's own sake, but for his

b) object:  

• felt towards those who take pleasure in our pleasure / pain in our pain

• or who love/hate the same people we do

• or who demonstrate good will towards us (via generosity / protection, etc)

• or who are good people, pleasant to be with

• those who are like us / share the same interests

c) cause: 

• when the other has wished our good for our own sake

4.  Fear and Confidence  (2.5)

 

4a.  Fear

 

a) definition:  pain cause by the expectation of some future evil.  Note:  This evil something that has the possibility to cause great harm/pain, and which is perceived as being not far off

 

b) object

• felt from being at the mercy of other

• or towards those who have been wrong and may want revenge

• or towards rivals, bullies

• or when one has no source of help

c) cause:  expectation of suffering

4b.  Confidence

 

a) definition:  the expectation that dreadful things are far off and safety near at hand [the opposite of fear].

 

b) object:

• felt when many sources of aid are available

• or when there is no one around who has been wronged

• or when there are no enemies around

c) cause:

•  constant success

•  having escaped unharmed from dangers in the past

•  having external resources (money, friends)  

6.  Shame  (2.6)

 

a)  definition:  pain concerning a class of evils, past, present or future, that seems to being a person into disrespect.  Involves the possibility of disgrace or loss of respect brought about to oneself or loved ones.

 

b) object:  

• felt towards those whose we admire or who admire us or who we wish to admire us.

• or those against whom we are in competition

• or  those those who are not inclined towards same vices we are

• or those likely to gossip

c) cause:

• disgrace produced by vice (cowardice, injustice, sexual intemperance)

• having not attained ones' proper status in society (especially because of ones own fault)

• having suffered unwillingly something shameful  (physical/sexual abuse)

 

7.  Pity (2.8)

 

a) definition:  pain over evil caused to someone who does not deserve it.  

 

1) Pity is not felt by:

• those who are completely ruined or who feel completely invulnerable to evil  (i.e., they are not able to sympathize)

 

2) Pity is felt by:

• those who have experience similar evils in the past and have escaped

• or by the elderly (whose life experience makes them more sympathetic)

• or by those who can image the same pain caused to themselves or to loved ones

c) object:

• felt towards those whom we know, but who are not closely related to us (or we would experience fear rather than pity)

• those who are like us in some way  (age, character, social standing, etc)

• those who are able to effectively (emotionally/dramatically) demonstrate or communicate the fully extent of their pain or suffering 

d) cause:  

• evils that cause destruction (death, injury, sickness, old age, famine)

• evils cause by chance (friendlessness, deformity, weakness)

• evils coming from what should be a source of good (family, friends)

 

8.  Indignation  (2.9)

 

a) definition:  pain at underserved good fortune  [the opposite of pity].

 

b) object:

• not felt towards those who are perceived as good/worthy

• felt towards newly rich/powerful  (Aristotle's snobbery?)

• or who are ill-suited for the goods they possess (the Beverly Hillbillies) 

c) cause:   the just/ambitious persons perception of another undeserved success

 

9.  Jealousy  (2.11)

 

a)  definition:  pain caused by the good fortune of those similar to ourselves,  because we want what they have for ourselves. 

• vs. envy:  pain caused by the good fortune of those similar to ourselves, not because we want what they have, but simply because we resent them having it (c.f., 2.10)

• Therefore jealousy is reasonable and positive (since it helps us to improve ourselves), while envy is often irrational and negative (since it is grounded in pure spite)

b) object:

• felt towards those who possess those goods that we ourselves desire but don't have

• or those whom we admire / seek to emulate

c) cause:

• desire for those goods that others possess (wealth, power, friends, etc.)

• a perception of one's own worthiness to possess these goods  (because of one's character, class or lineage)

Suggestions for Further Reading

• Cooper, John M.  "An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions."  Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.  Ed. Amelie O. Rorty.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1996. 

• Cooper, Lane, trans. and intro.  The Rhetoric of Aristotle.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ;  Prentice Hall, 1962.

• Frede, Dorothy.  "Mixed Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric."  Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.  Ed. Amelie O. Rorty.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1996. 

• Garver, Eugene.  Aristotle's Rhetoric.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1994.

• Gastaldi, Silvia.  "Pathe and Polis: Aristotle's Theory of Passions in the Rhetoric and the Ethics."  Topoi 6 (1987): 105-110. 

• Grimaldi, William.  Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Commentary.  2 vols.  New York: Fordham University Press, 1980-1988.

• Gill, Christopher.  "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism."  Classical Quarterly 34 (1984): 149-166.Kennedy, George A.  Aristotle:  On Rhetoric.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1991.

• Leighton, Stephen R.  "Aristotle and the Emotions." Phronesis 27 (1982): 144-174.

• Nussbaum, Martha.  "Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion."  Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.  Ed. Amelie O. Rorty.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1996. 

• Solmsen, Friedrich.  "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing Upon the Feelings."  Classical Philology 33 (1938) 390-404.

• Striker, Gisela.  "Emotions in Context:  Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and His Moral Psychology."  Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.  Ed. Amelie O. Rorty.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1996.