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Stoicism
[1]
Foundations
of Stoic Ethics
1. Who Were The Stoics?
The founder of the Stoic school
was Zeno, who was born in 333 BC in Citium on the island of Crete. In
311 he went to Athens to study philosophy under the cynic Crates and soon
began lecturing himself in a hall (stoa) across from the Acropolis.
The history of Stoic thought is
usually divided into three distinct periods: early, middle and
late:
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Stoic doctrine was develop
during the early period primarily by Zeno and his disciple, Chrysippus (d.
c. 208 BC). The later came to be known as the "completer"
of the Stoic system.
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Middle Stoics, such as
Panaetius (185-109 BC) and Posidonius (135-150 BC) would dangerously
modify
Stoic ethics to the point where it became indistinguishable from that of
the Peripatetics (the followers of Aristotle).
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The later Stoics wrote amidst
the turmoil of the Roman Empire during the first and century centuries
AD. Perhaps it was the turmoil of this period that led these later
thinker to reject the innovations of the Middle Stoics in favor of a much
more radical---though highly popularized---form of Stoic ethics. Among the
most notable of the later Stoics are Seneca (4 BC-65 AD), the freed slave
Epictetus (55-138 AD) and the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius (121-180
AD).
Unfortunately almost all that has
been written by the early and middle Stoics have been lost to posterity.
The source of most of our information about these thinkers comes from such
sources as Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers and
Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and On the Ends of Good and
Evil. The most important sources of later Stoic thought are the
various moral essays and epistles of Seneca, the Enchiridion of
Epictetus and the Meditations Marcus Aurelius.
2. Foundations
of Stoic
Ethics
I. Virtue as the Sole Good
The origin of the Stoic discussion on the happy
life is actually found in a work that we have already examined in
detail---Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We have seen in Book One
of this work that Aristotle maintains that happiness (eudaimonia)
is the end of life for all human beings. In Aristotle's opinion,
happiness is "an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect
virtue." Up until this point Aristotle and the Stoics are in
complete agreement; it is when Aristotle describes the nature of the supreme
good that conflict arises. In the Ethics, he states that there must be
a first good that is chosen for its own sake, which is an end in itself, and
everything else must be seen as a means towards this end. This supreme good,
of course will be virtue. In order for human beings to be truly happy,
however, certain external goods are required (Ethics 1101a 71102a 5-6;
1106a20) . What are some of these external goods that Aristotle
believes are necessary prerequisites for the happy life? In the Rhetoric,
he says that they include "noble birth, numerous friends, good friends,
good children, numerous children, a good old age; further bodily excellences,
such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a
good reputation, honor, good luck, virtue" (Rhetoric 1360b3-4).
Whereas Aristotle, then, accepts different senses
of the word "good", including health as well as virtue among good
things, the ancient Stoics, such as Zeno and Chrysippus, hold that virtue is
the exclusive good. In their view, those things that Aristotle calls external
goods are not at all morally relevant, since they could not affect virtue, and
subsequently are to be treated as morally indifferent (adiaphora).
Diogenes Laertius summarizing the Stoic position in his Lives of the
Philosophers describes their approach in the following way:
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Diogenes
Laertius
Lives
of the Philosophers VII
Virtue
as the Sole Good
[The Stoics] say that only the
morally beautiful is good..... They hold, that is that virtue and
whatever partakes of virtue consists in this; which is
equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the
term "good" has equal force with the term
"beautiful," which comes to the same thing.
"Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful,
therefore it is good." They hold that all goods are
equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits
of no lowering or heightening of intensity. Of things that are,
some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor
evil--that is, morally indifferent (adiaphora).
External
Things as Indifferent (Adiaphora)
Goods comprised the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance,
and the rest; while the opposites of these are evil, namely folly,
injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that
is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as
life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble
birth, and their opposites, death disease, pain ugliness, weakness,
poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like.....For,
[the Stoics say], such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not
in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under
the species or subdivision "things preferred." for as
the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good
is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit
than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good.
Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use
can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be
made; therefore wealth and health are not goods....
External
Things as Preferable/Rejectable
Of things indifferent, as they express it, some are
"preferred." others "rejected." Such as have
value, they say, are "preferred," while such as have
negative, instead of positive, value are "rejected."
Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living,
such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which
indirectly contributes to the knife according to nature: which is as
much as to say " any assistance brought by wealth or health
towards living a natural life"; thirdly, value is the full
equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the
facts-as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with
a mule thrown in.
Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive
value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral
improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health,
strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth;
and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and
the like. To the class of things "rejected" belong, of
mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among
bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition,
mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external
things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth. But again
there are things belonging to neither class; such as not
preferred, neither are they rejected....
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As
the above text indicates, among
the adiaphora, the Stoics considered some "preferred", since
they accord with nature; other things are to be "rejected" as
contrary to nature. The class of preferred things corresponds to Aristotle's
external goods, and includes such qualities as life, fame, health and beauty,
while the things rejected include their opposites—death, ignominy, sickness
and ugliness (Lives 7.87, 102). Although the preferables are morally
neutral, the wise man will make use of them if they are available, since they
are the material upon which virtuous action is based. In the end, though, they
remain inessential to the wise man: his virtue remains intact even if he
should have none of these advantages (Moralia 1069c-e).
II. The Problem of the "Preferables"
in Stoic Ethics
The ambiguity concerning the status of preferable
things, their relation to virtue and their role in the happy life inevitably
led to some criticism of the Stoic position. Plutarch, for one, attacked what
he perceived to be a dichotomy between the way the Stoics treated the
preferables in theory and in practice: "the Stoics in their works and
acts cling to things that are in conformity with nature as good things and
objects of choice, but in word and speech they reject and spurn them as
indifferent and useless and insignificant for happiness" (Moralia
1070a-b).
A similar view is expressed by Cicero, who
questioned whether there is any real difference between the Stoic and
Aristotelian teachings with respect to external goods. "Why what
difference does it make," he asked, "whether you call wealth, power,
health ‘goods’ (bona), or ‘things preferred’, when he who calls
them ‘goods’ assigns no more value to them than you who style exactly the
same things ‘preferred’" (Ends 4.23). Opponents of early Stoic
ethical theory correctly understood that the problem with the Stoic
formulation of the relation of preferred things to the supreme good is that
either the preferables should be considered goods, and therefore given some
moral status (Aristotle's position), or a more radical approach to the supreme good would have to be
taken to avoid contradiction.
III.
Seneca's Radical Stoicism
This more radical approach of attempting to argue that virtue alone is the
good and all other worldly things irrelevant was undertaken by later
Stoics such as Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. Although each of
these authors is fascinating to read, we will focus on Seneca, who has been
most responsible for popularizing stoic though (he also happens to be one of
my favorite philosophers).
I. The
Life of Seneca
Lucius Annaeus Seneca
was born in Cordoba, Spain around 4 0r 5 BC. His father, Marcus Annaeus
Seneca, was an imperial prosecutor in Roman Spain and a noted authority on
rhetoric. As a young man Seneca spent some years in Egypt, acquiring
experience in public administration. While he was relatively young, he
also developed an interest in Stoic ethics
and in time would become one of the most famous exponents of this school.
Returning to
Rome, Seneca began to move through the ranks of the imperial government,
eventually becoming a prominent and outspoken member of the Senate during the
reign of Caligula. Indeed Caligula was so jealous of Seneca's growing
influence that he ordered his execution in 37 AD, but he was persuaded to put
this death off when he told that Seneca was sickly and would not live long
anyway. In fact, Seneca outlived Caligula himself, who was assassinated
in 41 AD by members of his own guard.
Unfortunately
Seneca also ran afoul of Caligula's successor, Claudius, when he was accused
of committing adultery with Claudius' niece (Caligula's sister), Livilla.
Although he was once again condemned to death, his sentence was eventually
commuted to banishment to the island of Corsica. Whether or not Seneca
actually committed the adulterous act for which he was charged is not
known. In all likelihood he was innocent and his real offense was
getting on the bad side of the emperor's erratic and lascivious wife, the notorious
Messalina.
After the
execution of Messalina in 49 AD, Seneca's luck had a turn for the better, when
he was recalled to Rome by the emperor's new wife, Agrippina, to act as a
tutor for her son Nero. In 54 AD, Claudius was poisoned by Agrippina,
and Seneca became the de facto ruler of the empire during young Nero's first
five years as emperor. He is credited for keeping Nero's sordid and
violent passions under control and providing the best administration that the
empire had seen in some time.
By 59 AD Nero
had begun to show his true colors and had his mother murdered (after a comical
attempt to have her drowned in a collapsible boat). The subsequent
acts of violence committed by the emperor convinced Seneca that his positive
influence upon Nero was waning and that it was time to withdraw from public
life. He spent the last three years of his life away from Rome writing
many of his most famous philosophical works. In 65 AD, however, he was
implicated in a conspiracy against Nero, and commanded to commit suicide (a
common form of execution for Roman noblemen who displeased the emperor).
According to Tacitus, Seneca was dining with his wife and some friends, when
word came that he must depart from this life:
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Tacitus,
The
Death of Seneca
Unperturbed, Seneca asked for his will. But the officer [sent by
Nero] refused. Then Seneca turned to his friends. "Being
forbidden," he said, "to show gratitude for your services, I
leave you with my one remaining possession, and my best: the pattern of my
life. If you remember it, your devoted friendship will be rewarded
by a name for virtuous accomplishments." As he talked---and
sometimes in sterner and more imperative terms---he checked their tears
and sought to revive their courage. Where had their philosophy gone,
he asked, and that resolution against impending misfortunes which they had
devised over so many years? "Surely nobody was unaware that
Nero was cruel!" he added. "After murdering his mother and
brother, it only remained for him to kill his teacher and tutor."
These words were evidently intended for public hearing. Then Seneca
embraced his wife [Paulina], with a tenderness very different from his
philosophical imperturbability, entreated her to moderate and set a term
to her grief, and take just consolation, in her bereavement, from
contemplating his well-spent life. Nevertheless, she insisted on
dying with him, and demanded the executioner's stroke. Seneca did
not oppose her brave decision. In deed, loving her wholeheartedly,
he was reluctant to leave her behind to be persecuted. "Solace
in life was what I commended to you," he said. "But
you prefer death and glory. I will not grudge your setting so fine
an example. We can die with equal fortitude. But yours will be
the nobler end."
Then, each with one incision of the blade, he and his wife cut their
arms. But Seneca's aged body, lean from austere living, released the
blood too slowly. So he also severed the veins in his ankles and
behind his knees. Exhausted by severe pain, he was afraid of
weakening his wife's endurance by betraying his agony---or losing his own
self-possession at the sight of her suffering. So he asked her to go
into another bedroom....
Nero did not dislike Paulina personally. In order, therefore, to
avoid increasing his ill-repute for cruelty, he ordered her suicide to be
averted. So, on instructions from the soldiers, slaves and ex-claves
bandaged her arms and stopped the bleeding....She lived in for a few
years, honorably loyal to her husband's memory, with pallid features and
limbs which showed how much vital blood she had lost.
Meanwhile Seneca's death was slow and lingering. Poisons,
such as formerly used to execute State criminals at Athens, had long been prepared;
and Seneca now entreated his experienced doctor Annaeus Statius, who was
also an old friend,
to supply it. But when it came, Seneca drank it without
effect. For his limbs were already cold and numbed against the
poison's action. Finally he was placed in a bath of warm
water. He sprinkled a little of it on the attendant slaves,
commenting that this was his libation to Jupiter. He was then
carried into a vapor-bath, where he suffocated. His cremation was
without ceremony, in accordance with his own instructions about his
death---written at the height of his wealth and power.
Poisons:
The poison drunk by Seneca, as by Socrates, was hemlock
Tacitus.
The Annals of Imperial Rome. Trans. Michael Grant (New
York: Penguin Books, 1976), 375-377. |
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II. The
Works of Seneca
Although he also wrote some rather mediocre plays, Seneca is best know for
his 124 moral epistles (letters that he wrote to his younger colleague, Lucilius,
advising him on how to attain happiness through the proper uses of Stoic
practices) and moral essay (the most important being "On
Providence," "On Anger," "On the Happy Life" and
"On Tranquility of Spirit").
III. Reading a Senecan
Epistle
In the following epistle, Seneca tries to persuade Lucilius that such
seeming goods as wealth, long life or fame are actually completely indifferent
for one happiness (as are such apparent evils as poverty, sickness or public
disgrace). In fact, he warns that so-called goods as riches can actually
bring immeasurable harm to one's soul, while things like sickness and poverty,
on the other hand, can build virtue:
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Seneca,
Epistle 74
"On
Virtue as a Refuge from Worldly Distractions"
Your letter has given me pleasure, and has roused me from sluggishness.
It has also prompted my memory, which has been for some time slack and
nerveless.
Virtue
as the Supreme Good
You are right, of course, my dear Lucilius, in deeming the chief means of
attaining the happy life to consist in the belief that the only good lies
in that which is honorable. For anyone who
deems other things to be good, puts himself in the power of Fortune, and
goes under the control of another; but he who has in every case defined
the good by the honorable, is happy with an inward happiness.
The
Passions as the Cause of Misery
One man is saddened when his children die; another is anxious when they
become ill; a third is embittered when they do something disgraceful, or
suffer a taint in their reputation. One man, you will observe, is
tortured by passion for his neighbor's wife, another by passion for his
own. You will find men who are completely upset by failure to win an
election, and others who are actually plagued by the offices which they
have won. But the largest throng of unhappy men among the host of
mortals are those whom the expectation of death, which threatens them on
every hand, drives to despair. For there is no quarter from which
death may not approach. Hence, like soldiers scouting in the enemy's
country, they must look about in all directions and turn their heads at
every sound; unless the breast be rid of this fear, one lives with a
palpitating heart. You will readily recall those who have been
driven into exile and dispossessed of their property. You will also
recall (and this is the most serious kind of destitution) those who are
poor in the midst of their riches. You will recall men who have
suffered shipwreck, or those whose sufferings resemble shipwreck; for they
were untroubled and at ease, when the anger or perhaps the envy of the
populace,--a missile most deadly to those in high places,--dismantled them
like a storm which is wont to rise when one is most confident of continued
calm, or like a sudden stroke of lightening which even causes the region
round about it to tremble. For just as anyone who stands near the
bolt is stunned and resembles one who is struck, so in these sudden and
violent mishaps, although but one person is overwhelmed by the disaster,
the rest are overwhelmed by fear, and the possibility that they may suffer
makes them as downcast as the actual sufferer.
Every man is troubled in spirit by evils that come suddenly upon his
neighbor. Like birds, who cower even at the whirr of an empty sling,
we are distracted by mere sounds as well as by blows. No man
therefore can be happy if he yields himself up to such foolish fancies.
For nothing brings happiness unless it also brings calm; it is a bad sort
of existence that is spent in apprehension. Whoever has largely
surrendered himself to the power of Fortune has made for himself a huge
web of disquietude, from which he cannot get free; if one would win a way
to safety, there is but one road,--to despise externals and to be
contented with that which is honorable. For those who regard
anything as better than virtue, or believe that there is any good except
virtue, are spreading their arms to gather in that which Fortune tosses
abroad, and are anxiously awaiting her favors.
Picture now to yourself that Fortune is holding a festival, and is
showering down honors, riches, and influence upon this mob of
mortals; some of these gifts have already been torn to pieces in the hands
of those who try to snatch them, others have been divided up by
treacherous partnerships, and still others have been seized to the great
detriment of those into whose possession they have come. Certain of
these favors have fallen to men while they were absent-minded; others have
been lost to their seekers because they were snatching too eagerly for
them, and, just because they are greedily seized upon, have been knocked
from their hands. There is not a man among them all, however,--even
he who has been lucky in the booty which has fallen to him,--whose joy in
his spoil has lasted until the morrow....
The
Right Way to Use the Things of the World
Let us limit the
Supreme Good to the soul; it loses its meaning if it
is taken from the best part of us and applied to the worst, that is, if it
is transferred to the senses; for the senses are more active in dumb
beasts. The sum total of our happiness must not be placed in the
flesh; the true goods are those which reason bestows, substantial and
eternal; they cannot fall away, neither can they grow less or be
diminished Other things are goods according to opinion, and though
they are called by the same name as the true goods, the essence of
goodness is not in them. Let us therefore call them
"advantages," and, to use our technical term, "preferred"
things. Let us, however, recognize that they are our
chattels, not parts of ourselves; and let us have them in our possession,
but take heed to remember that they are outside ourselves. Even
though they are in our possession, they are to be reckoned as things
subordinate and poor, the possession of which gives no man a right to
plume himself.
For what is more foolish than being self-complacent
about something which one has not accomplished by one's own efforts?
Let everything of this nature be added to us, and not stick fast to us, so
that, if it is withdrawn, it may come away without tearing off any part of
us. Let us use these things, but not boast of them, and let us use
them sparingly, as if they were given for safe-keeping and will be
withdrawn. Anyone who does not employ reason in his possession of
them never keeps them long; for prosperity of itself, if
uncontrolled by reason, overwhelms itself. If anyone has put his
trust in goods that are most fleeting, he is soon bereft of them, and, to
avoid being bereft, he suffers distress.
Few men have been permitted
to lay aside prosperity gently. The rest all fall, together with the
things amid which they have come into eminence, and they are weighted down
by the very things which had before exalted them. For this reason
foresight must be brought into play, to insist upon a limit or upon
frugality in the use of these things, since license overthrows and
destroys its own abundance. That which has no limit has never
endured, unless reason, which sets limits, has held it in check. The
fate of many cities will prove the truth of this; their sway has ceased at
the very prime because they were given to luxury, and excess has ruined
all that had been won by virtue. We should fortify ourselves
against such calamities. But no wall can be erected against Fortune
which she cannot take by storm; let us strengthen our inner defenses.
If the inner part be safe, man can be attacked, but never captured.
Happiness
Comes Though Following Reason
Do you wish to know what this weapon of defense is? It is the
ability to refrain from chafing over whatever happens to one, of knowing
that the very agencies which seem to bring harm are working for the
preservation of the world, and are a part of the scheme for bringing to
fulfillment the order of the universe and its functions. Let man be
pleased with whatever has pleased God; let him marvel at himself and his
own resources for this very reason, that he cannot be overcome, that he
has the very powers of evil subject to his control, and that he brings
into subjection chance and pain and wrong by means of that strongest of
powers--reason. Love reason! The love of reason will arm you
against the greatest hardships. Wild beasts dash against the
hunter's spear through love of their young, and it is their wildness and
their unpremeditated onrush that keep them from being tamed; often a
desire for glory has stirred the mind of youth to despise both sword and
stake; the mere vision and semblance of virtue impel certain men to a
self-imposed death. In proportion as reason is stouter and steadier
than any of these emotions, so much the more forcefully will she make her
way through the midst of utter terrors and dangers.
An
Aristotelian Objection: Worldly Advantages as Good
Men say to us: "You are mistaken if you maintain that nothing
is a good except that which is honorable; a defense like this will not
make you safe from Fortune and free from her assaults. For you
maintain that dutiful children, and a well-governed country, and good
parents, are to be reckoned as goods; but you cannot see these dear
objects in danger and be yourself as ease. Your calm will be
disturbed by a siege conducted against your country, by the death of your
children, or by the enslaving of your parents." I will first
state what we Stoics usually reply to these objectors, and then will add
what additional answer should, in my opinion, be given.
The situation is entirely different in the case of goods whose loss
entails some hardship substituted in their place; for example, when good
health is impaired there is a change to ill-health; when the eye is put
out, we are visited with blindness; we not only lose our speed when our
leg-muscles are cut, but infirmity takes the place of speed. But no
such danger is involved in the case of the goods to which we referred a
moment ago. And why? If I have lost a good friend, I have no
false friend whom I must endure in his place; nor if I have buried a
dutiful son, must I face in exchange unfilial conduct. In the second
place, this does not mean to me the taking-off of a friend or of a child;
it is the mere taking-off of their bodies. But a good can be lost in
only one way, by changing into what is bad; and this is impossible
according to the law of nature, because every virtue, and every work of
virtue, abides uncorrupted.
Again, even if friends have perished, or
children of approved goodness who fulfill their father's prayers for them,
there is something that can fill their place. Do you ask what this
is? It is that which had made them good in the first place, namely,
virtue. Virtue suffers no space in us to be unoccupied; it takes
possession of the whole soul and removes all sense of loss. It alone
is sufficient; for the strength and beginnings of all goods exist in
virtue herself. What does it matter if running water is cut off and
flows away, as long as the fountain from which it has flowed is unharmed?
You will not maintain that a man's life is more just if his children are
unharmed than if they have passed away, nor yet better appointed, nor more
intelligent, nor more honorable; therefore, no better, either. The
addition of friends does not make one wiser, nor does their taking away
make one more foolish; therefore, not happier or more wretched, either.
As long as your virtue is unharmed, you will not feel the loss of anything
that has been withdrawn from you. You may say: "Come now;
is not a man happier when girt about with a large company of friends and
children?" Why should this be so? For the Supreme Good is
neither impaired nor increased thereby; it abides within its own limits,
no matter how Fortune has conducted herself. Whether a long old age
falls to one's lot, or whether the end comes on this side of old age--the
measure of the Supreme Good is unvaried, in spite of the difference in
years....
The other answer, which I promised to make to your objection, follows from
this reasoning. The wise man is not distressed by the loss of
children or of friends. For he endures their death in the same
spirit in which he awaits his own. And he fears the the one as
little as he grieves for the other. For the underlying principle of
virtue is conformity; all the works of virtue are in harmony and
agreement with virtue itself. But this harmony is lost if the soul,
which ought to be uplifted, is cast down by grief or a sense of loss
It is ever a dishonor for a man to be troubled and fretted, to be numbed
when there is any call for activity. For that which is honorable is
free from care and untrammeled, is unafraid, and stands girt for action.
Example
of the Stoic Wise Man
"What," you ask, "will the wise man experience no emotion
like disturbance of spirit? Will not his features change color, his
countenance be agitated, and his limbs grow cold? And there are
other things which we do, not under the influence of the will, but
unconsciously and as the result of a sort of natural impulse."
I admit that this is true; but the sage will retain the firm belief that
none of these things is evil, or important enough to make a healthy mind
break down. Whatever shall remain to be done virtue can do with
courage and readiness. For anyone would admit that it is a mark of
folly to do in a slothful and rebellious spirit whatever one has to do, or
to direct the body in one direction and the mind in another, and thus to
be torn between utterly conflicting emotions. For folly is despised
precisely because of the things for which she vaunts and admires herself,
and she does not do gladly even those things in which she prides herself.
But if folly fears some evil, she is burdened by it in the very moment of
awaiting it, just as if it had actually come,--already suffering in
apprehension whatever she fears she may suffer. Just as in the body
symptoms of latent ill-health precede the disease--there is, for example,
a certain weak sluggishness, a lassitude which is not the result of any
work, a trembling, and a shivering that pervades the limbs,--so the feeble
spirit is shaken by its ills a long time before it is overcome by them.
It anticipates them, and totters before its time.
But what is greater madness than to be tortured by the future and not to
save your strength for the actual suffering but to invite and bring on
wretchedness? If you cannot be rid of it, you ought at least
to postpone it. Will you not understand that no man should be
tormented by the future? The man who has been told that he will have
to endure torture fifty years from now is not disturbed thereby, unless he
has leaped over the intervening years, and has projected himself into the
trouble that is destined to arrive a generation later. In the same
way, souls that enjoy being sick and that seize upon excuses for sorrow
are saddened by events long past and effaced from the records. Past
and future are both absent; we feel neither of them. But there can
be no pain except as the result of what you feel. Farewell.
honorable: the term here is being used synonymously
with virtuous. Likewise, when Seneca uses the term dishonorable he
means vicious.
soul: once again he is referring to the good of
the soul or virtue.
preferred things: he is throwing a
bone here to the traditional stoic concepts of "preferable" and
"rejectable" things, although his arguments in this epistle
undermine these concepts completely. |
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IV.
Summarizing Various Perspectives on Happiness
Before you get
too confused, this might be a good point to clarify all the positions that we
have examine so far:
1. Terms
-
(morally)
good: that which contributes to our happiness (morally positive)
-
(morally)
bad: that which adversely affects our happiness (morally
negative)
-
indifferent
(things): those things which neither contribute to or
adversely affect our happiness (morally neutral)
-
preferable
(indifferent things): those things which neither contribute to
or adversely affect our happiness....but worth having if they
are available (morally neutral for ancient Stoics, morally
positive for middle Stoics, but potentially negative Seneca).
-
rejectable
(indifferent things): those things which neither contribute to
or adversely affect our happiness....but probably should be avoided if
possible (morally neutral for ancient Stoics, morally negative for
middle Stoics, but potentially positive for Seneca).
2. Summing
it All Up
|
Aristotle |
| GOOD |
BAD |
| virtue
and external goods (noble birth, numerous friends, good
friends, good children, numerous children, good old age, health, beauty,
strength, good reputation, honor, good luck) |
vice and external evils
(ignoble birth, few friends, bad friends, bad children, no children, bad
old age, sickness, ugliness, weakness, a bad reputation, dishonor, bad
luck) |
|
The
Early Stoics |
| GOOD |
PREFERABLE
(INDIFF) |
REJECTABLE
(INDIFF) |
BAD |
| virtue |
external goods |
external evils |
vice |
|
Seneca |
| GOOD |
COMPLETELY
INDIFFERENT |
BAD |
| virtue |
everything other than
virtue and vice |
vice |
The Stoics
would have us believe that if we recognize virtue as our sole good and scorn
worldly advantages as completely indifferent to our well-being, we cannot help but
be happy. Why then are so many people in this world, so miserably
unhappy?
As we shall see
in the next section, the Stoics maintain that it is the passions that
cause us to incorrectly judge such things as sickness and poverty as bad and
such things as health and wealth as good. By investing ourselves
emotionally in this that are subject to the whims of Fate, we are opening
ourselves up to misery. But
the Stoics also believe that if we can
just find a way to eradicate our passions, our happiness will virtually be
guaranteed.

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