Stoicism [1]

Foundations of Stoic Ethics

1.   Who Were The Stoics?

The founder of the Stoic school was Zeno, who was born in 333 BC in Citium on the island of Crete.  In 311 he went to Athens to study philosophy under the cynic Crates and soon began lecturing himself in a hall (stoa) across from the Acropolis.

The history of Stoic thought is usually divided into three distinct periods:  early, middle and late:  

  • Stoic doctrine was develop during the early period primarily by Zeno and his disciple, Chrysippus (d. c. 208 BC).  The later came to be known as the "completer" of the Stoic system.

  • Middle Stoics, such as Panaetius (185-109 BC) and Posidonius  (135-150 BC) would dangerously modify Stoic ethics to the point where it became indistinguishable from that of the Peripatetics (the followers of Aristotle).  

  • The later Stoics wrote amidst the turmoil of the Roman Empire during the first and century centuries AD.  Perhaps it was the turmoil of this period that led these later thinker to reject the innovations of the Middle Stoics in favor of a much more radical---though highly popularized---form of Stoic ethics. Among the most notable of the later Stoics are Seneca (4 BC-65 AD), the freed slave Epictetus (55-138 AD) and the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD). 

Unfortunately almost all that has been written by the early and middle Stoics have been lost to posterity.  The source of most of our information about these thinkers comes from such sources as Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers and Cicero's  Tusculan Disputations and On the Ends of Good and Evil.  The most important sources of later Stoic thought are the various moral essays and epistles of Seneca, the Enchiridion of Epictetus and the Meditations Marcus Aurelius.

2.  Foundations of Stoic Ethics

I. Virtue as the Sole Good

The origin of the Stoic discussion on the happy life is actually found in a work that we have already examined in detail---Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.  We have seen in Book One of this work that Aristotle maintains that happiness (eudaimonia) is the end of life for all human beings.  In Aristotle's opinion, happiness is "an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue."  Up until this point Aristotle and the Stoics are in complete agreement; it is when Aristotle describes the nature of the supreme good that conflict arises. In the Ethics, he states that there must be a first good that is chosen for its own sake, which is an end in itself, and everything else must be seen as a means towards this end. This supreme good, of course will be virtue.  In order for human beings to be truly happy, however, certain external goods are required (Ethics 1101a 71102a 5-6; 1106a20) . What are some of these external goods that Aristotle believes are necessary prerequisites for the happy life? In the Rhetoric, he says that they include "noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, good children, numerous children, a good old age; further bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honor, good luck, virtue" (Rhetoric 1360b3-4).

Whereas Aristotle, then, accepts different senses of the word "good", including health as well as virtue among good things, the ancient Stoics, such as Zeno and Chrysippus, hold that virtue is the exclusive good. In their view, those things that Aristotle calls external goods are not at all morally relevant, since they could not affect virtue, and subsequently are to be treated as morally indifferent (adiaphora).  Diogenes Laertius summarizing the Stoic position in his Lives of the Philosophers describes their approach in the following way: 

     
 

Diogenes Laertius

Lives of the Philosophers VII

 

Virtue as the Sole Good

 

    [The Stoics] say that only the morally beautiful is good..... They hold, that is that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this;  which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term "good" has equal force with the term "beautiful," which comes to the same thing.  "Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is  good."  They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity.  Of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil--that is, morally indifferent (adiaphora).

 

External Things as Indifferent (Adiaphora)

 

    Goods comprised the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evil, namely folly, injustice, and the rest.  Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death disease, pain ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like.....For, [the Stoics say], such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision "things preferred."  for as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good.  Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods....

 

External Things as Preferable/Rejectable

 

    Of things indifferent, as they express it, some are "preferred." others "rejected."  Such as have value, they say, are "preferred," while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are "rejected."  Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the knife according to nature: which is as much as to say " any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life"; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts-as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.

    Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth; and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. To the class of  things "rejected" belong, of mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth.  But again there are things belonging  to neither class; such as not preferred, neither are they rejected....

 
     

   

As the above text indicates, among the adiaphora, the Stoics considered some "preferred", since they accord with nature; other things are to be "rejected" as contrary to nature. The class of preferred things corresponds to Aristotle's external goods, and includes such qualities as life, fame, health and beauty, while the things rejected include their opposites—death, ignominy, sickness and ugliness (Lives 7.87, 102). Although the preferables are morally neutral, the wise man will make use of them if they are available, since they are the material upon which virtuous action is based. In the end, though, they remain inessential to the wise man: his virtue remains intact even if he should have none of these advantages (Moralia 1069c-e). 

II. The Problem of the "Preferables" in Stoic Ethics

The ambiguity concerning the status of preferable things, their relation to virtue and their role in the happy life inevitably led to some criticism of the Stoic position. Plutarch, for one, attacked what he perceived to be a dichotomy between the way the Stoics treated the preferables in theory and in practice: "the Stoics in their works and acts cling to things that are in conformity with nature as good things and objects of choice, but in word and speech they reject and spurn them as indifferent and useless and insignificant for happiness" (Moralia 1070a-b). 

A similar view is expressed by Cicero, who questioned whether there is any real difference between the Stoic and Aristotelian teachings with respect to external goods. "Why what difference does it make," he asked, "whether you call wealth, power, health ‘goods’ (bona), or ‘things preferred’, when he who calls them ‘goods’ assigns no more value to them than you who style exactly the same things ‘preferred’" (Ends 4.23). Opponents of early Stoic ethical theory correctly understood that the problem with the Stoic formulation of the relation of preferred things to the supreme good is that either the preferables should be considered goods, and therefore given some moral status (Aristotle's position), or a more radical approach to the supreme good would have to be taken to avoid contradiction.

III.  Seneca's Radical Stoicism

This more radical approach of attempting to argue that virtue alone is the good and all other worldly things  irrelevant was undertaken by later Stoics such as Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius.  Although each of these authors is fascinating to read, we will focus on Seneca, who has been most responsible for popularizing stoic though (he also happens to be one of my favorite philosophers).

I.  The Life of  Seneca

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born in Cordoba, Spain around 4 0r 5 BC.  His father, Marcus Annaeus Seneca, was an imperial prosecutor in Roman Spain and a noted authority on rhetoric.  As a young man Seneca spent some years in Egypt, acquiring experience in public administration.  While he was relatively young, he also developed an interest in Stoic ethics and in time would become one of the most famous exponents of this school.

Returning to Rome, Seneca began to move through the ranks of the imperial government, eventually becoming a prominent and outspoken member of the Senate during the reign of Caligula.  Indeed Caligula was so jealous of Seneca's growing influence that he ordered his execution in 37 AD, but he was persuaded to put this death off when he told that Seneca was sickly and would not live long anyway.  In fact, Seneca outlived Caligula himself, who was assassinated in 41 AD by members of his own guard.  

Unfortunately Seneca also ran afoul of Caligula's successor, Claudius, when he was accused of committing adultery with Claudius' niece (Caligula's sister), Livilla.  Although he was once again condemned to death, his sentence was eventually commuted to banishment to the island of Corsica.  Whether or not Seneca actually committed the adulterous act for which he was charged is not known.  In all likelihood he was innocent and his real offense was getting on the bad side of the emperor's erratic and lascivious wife, the notorious Messalina.

After the execution of Messalina in 49 AD, Seneca's luck had a turn for the better, when he was recalled to Rome by the emperor's new wife, Agrippina, to act as a tutor for her son Nero.  In 54 AD, Claudius was poisoned by Agrippina, and Seneca became the de facto ruler of the empire during young Nero's first five years as emperor.  He is credited for keeping Nero's sordid and violent passions under control and providing the best administration that the empire had seen in some time.  

By 59 AD Nero had begun to show his true colors and had his mother murdered (after a comical attempt to have her drowned in a collapsible boat).   The subsequent acts of violence committed by the emperor convinced Seneca that his positive influence upon Nero was waning and that it was time to withdraw from public life.  He spent the last three years of his life away from Rome writing many of his most famous philosophical works.  In 65 AD, however, he was implicated in a conspiracy against Nero, and commanded to commit suicide (a common form of execution for Roman noblemen who displeased the emperor).  According to Tacitus, Seneca was dining with his wife and some friends, when word came that he must depart from this life:

     
 

Tacitus,

The Death of Seneca

 

    Unperturbed, Seneca asked for his will.  But the officer [sent by Nero] refused.  Then Seneca turned to his friends.  "Being forbidden," he said, "to show gratitude for your services, I leave you with my one remaining possession, and my best: the pattern of my life.  If you remember it, your devoted friendship will be rewarded by a name for virtuous accomplishments."  As he talked---and sometimes in sterner and more imperative terms---he checked their tears and sought to revive their courage.  Where had their philosophy gone, he asked, and that resolution against impending misfortunes which they had devised over so many years?  "Surely nobody was unaware that Nero was cruel!" he added.  "After murdering his mother and brother, it only remained for him to kill his teacher and tutor."

    These words were evidently intended for public hearing.  Then Seneca embraced his wife [Paulina], with a tenderness very different from his philosophical imperturbability, entreated her to moderate and set a term to her grief, and take just consolation, in her bereavement, from contemplating his well-spent life.  Nevertheless, she insisted on dying with him, and demanded the executioner's stroke.  Seneca did not oppose her brave decision.  In deed, loving her wholeheartedly, he was reluctant to leave her behind to be persecuted.  "Solace in life was what I commended to you,"  he said.  "But you prefer death and glory.  I will not grudge your setting so fine an example.  We can die with equal fortitude.  But yours will be the nobler end."

    Then, each with one incision of the blade, he and his wife cut their arms.  But Seneca's aged body, lean from austere living, released the blood too slowly.  So he also severed the veins in his ankles and behind his knees.  Exhausted by severe pain, he was afraid of weakening his wife's endurance by betraying his agony---or losing his own self-possession at the sight of her suffering.  So he asked her to go into another bedroom....

    Nero did not dislike Paulina personally.  In order, therefore, to avoid increasing his ill-repute for cruelty, he ordered her suicide to be averted.  So, on instructions from the soldiers, slaves and ex-claves bandaged her arms and stopped the bleeding....She lived in for a few years, honorably loyal to her husband's memory, with pallid features and limbs which showed how much vital blood she had lost.

    Meanwhile Seneca's death was slow and lingering.  Poisons, such as formerly used to execute State criminals at Athens, had long been prepared; and Seneca now entreated his experienced doctor Annaeus Statius, who was also an old friend, to supply it.  But when it came, Seneca drank it without effect.  For his limbs were already cold and numbed against the poison's action.  Finally he was placed in a bath of warm water.  He sprinkled a little of it on the attendant slaves, commenting that this was his libation to Jupiter.  He was then carried into a vapor-bath, where he suffocated.  His cremation was without ceremony, in accordance with his own instructions about his death---written at the height of his wealth and power.

 

Poisons:  The poison drunk by Seneca, as by Socrates, was hemlock

 

Tacitus.  The Annals of Imperial Rome.  Trans. Michael Grant  (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 375-377.

 
     

II.  The Works of Seneca

Although he also wrote some rather mediocre plays, Seneca is best know for his 124 moral epistles (letters that he wrote to his younger colleague, Lucilius, advising him on how to attain happiness through the proper uses of Stoic practices) and moral essay (the most important being "On Providence," "On Anger," "On the Happy Life" and "On Tranquility of Spirit").  

III.  Reading a Senecan Epistle

In the following epistle, Seneca tries to persuade Lucilius  that such seeming goods as wealth, long life or fame are actually completely indifferent for one happiness (as are such apparent evils as poverty, sickness or public disgrace).  In fact, he warns that so-called goods as riches can actually bring immeasurable harm to one's soul, while things like sickness and poverty, on the other hand, can build virtue:

 

 

 
 

Seneca, Epistle 74

"On Virtue as a Refuge from Worldly Distractions"

 

    Your letter has given me pleasure, and has roused me from sluggishness.  It has also prompted my memory, which has been for some time slack and nerveless.

 

Virtue as the Supreme Good

 

    You are right, of course, my dear Lucilius, in deeming the chief means of attaining the happy life to consist in the belief that the only good lies in that which is honorable.  For anyone who deems other things to be good, puts himself in the power of Fortune, and goes under the control of another; but he who has in every case defined the good by the honorable, is happy with an inward happiness.

 

The Passions as the Cause of Misery

 

    One man is saddened when his children die; another is anxious when they become ill; a third is embittered when they do something disgraceful, or suffer a taint in their reputation.  One man, you will observe, is tortured by passion for his neighbor's wife, another by passion for his own.  You will find men who are completely upset by failure to win an election, and others who are actually plagued by the offices which they have won.  But the largest throng of unhappy men among the host of mortals are those whom the expectation of death, which threatens them on every hand, drives to despair.  For there is no quarter from which death may not approach.  Hence, like soldiers scouting in the enemy's country, they must look about in all directions and turn their heads at every sound; unless the breast be rid of this fear, one lives with a palpitating heart.  You will readily recall those who have been driven into exile and dispossessed of their property.  You will also recall (and this is the most serious kind of destitution) those who are poor in the midst of their riches.  You will recall men who have suffered shipwreck, or those whose sufferings resemble shipwreck; for they were untroubled and at ease, when the anger or perhaps the envy of the populace,--a missile most deadly to those in high places,--dismantled them like a storm which is wont to rise when one is most confident of continued calm, or like a sudden stroke of lightening which even causes the region round about it to tremble.  For just as anyone who stands near the bolt is stunned and resembles one who is struck, so in these sudden and violent mishaps, although but one person is overwhelmed by the disaster, the rest are overwhelmed by fear, and the possibility that they may suffer makes them as downcast as the actual sufferer.

    Every man is troubled in spirit by evils that come suddenly upon his neighbor.  Like birds, who cower even at the whirr of an empty sling, we are distracted by mere sounds as well as by blows.  No man therefore can be happy if he yields himself up to such foolish fancies.  For nothing brings happiness unless it also brings calm; it is a bad sort of existence that is spent in apprehension.  Whoever has largely surrendered himself to the power of Fortune has made for himself a huge web of disquietude, from which he cannot get free; if one would win a way to safety, there is but one road,--to despise externals and to be contented with that which is honorable.  For those who regard anything as better than virtue, or believe that there is any good except virtue, are spreading their arms to gather in that which Fortune tosses abroad, and are anxiously awaiting her favors.  

    Picture now to yourself that Fortune is holding a festival, and is showering down honors,  riches, and influence upon this mob of mortals; some of these gifts have already been torn to pieces in the hands of those who try to snatch them, others have been divided up by treacherous partnerships, and still others have been seized to the great detriment of those into whose possession they have come.  Certain of these favors have fallen to men while they were absent-minded; others have been lost to their seekers because they were snatching too eagerly for them, and, just because they are greedily seized upon, have been knocked from their hands.  There is not a man among them all, however,--even he who has been lucky in the booty which has fallen to him,--whose joy in his spoil has lasted until the morrow....

 

The Right Way to Use the Things of the World

 

    Let us limit the Supreme Good to the soul; it loses its meaning if it is taken from the best part of us and applied to the worst, that is, if it is transferred to the senses; for the senses are more active in dumb beasts.  The sum total of our happiness must not be placed in the flesh; the true goods are those which reason bestows, substantial and eternal; they cannot fall away, neither can they grow less or be diminished  Other things are goods according to opinion, and though they are called by the same name as the true goods, the essence of goodness is not in them.  Let us therefore call them "advantages," and, to use our technical term, "preferred" things.  Let us, however, recognize that they are our chattels, not parts of ourselves; and let us have them in our possession, but take heed to remember that they are outside ourselves.  Even though they are in our possession, they are to be reckoned as things subordinate and poor, the possession of which gives no man a right to plume himself.  

    For what is more foolish than being self-complacent about something which  one has not accomplished by one's own efforts?  Let everything of this nature be added to us, and not stick fast to us, so that, if it is withdrawn, it may come away without tearing off any part of us.  Let us use these things, but not boast of them, and let us use them sparingly, as if they were given for safe-keeping and will be withdrawn.  Anyone who does not employ reason in his possession of them never keeps them long;  for prosperity of itself, if uncontrolled by reason, overwhelms itself.  If anyone has put his trust in goods that are most fleeting, he is soon bereft of them, and, to avoid being bereft, he suffers distress.  

    Few men have been permitted to lay aside prosperity gently.  The rest all fall, together with the things amid which they have come into eminence, and they are weighted down by the very things which had before exalted them.  For this reason foresight must be brought into play, to insist upon a limit or upon frugality in the use of these things, since license overthrows and destroys its own abundance.  That which has no limit has never endured, unless reason, which sets limits, has held it in check.  The fate of many cities will prove the truth of this; their sway has ceased at the very prime because they were given to luxury, and excess has ruined all that had been won by virtue.  We  should fortify ourselves against such calamities.  But no wall can be erected against Fortune which she cannot take by storm; let us strengthen our inner defenses.  If the inner part be safe, man can be attacked, but never captured.

 

Happiness Comes Though Following Reason

 

    Do you wish to know what this weapon of defense is?  It is the ability to refrain from chafing over whatever happens to one, of knowing that the very agencies which seem to bring harm are working for the preservation of the world, and are a part of the scheme for bringing to fulfillment the order of the universe and its functions.  Let man be pleased with whatever has pleased God; let him marvel at himself and his own resources for this very reason, that he cannot be overcome, that he has the very powers of evil subject to his control, and that he brings into subjection chance and pain and wrong by means of that strongest of powers--reason.  Love reason!  The love of reason will arm you against the greatest hardships.  Wild beasts dash against the hunter's spear through love of their young, and it is their wildness and their unpremeditated onrush that keep them from being tamed; often a desire for glory has stirred the mind of youth to despise both sword and stake; the mere vision and semblance of virtue impel certain men to a self-imposed death.  In proportion as reason is stouter and steadier than any of these emotions, so much the more forcefully will she make her way through the midst of utter terrors and dangers.

 

An Aristotelian Objection:  Worldly Advantages as Good

 

    Men say to us:  "You are mistaken if you maintain that nothing is a good except that which is honorable; a defense like this will not make you safe from Fortune and free from her assaults.  For you maintain that dutiful children, and a well-governed country, and good parents, are to be reckoned as goods; but you cannot see these dear objects in danger and be yourself as ease.  Your calm will be disturbed by a siege conducted against your country, by the death of your children, or by the enslaving of your parents."  I will first state what we Stoics usually reply to these objectors, and then will add what additional answer should, in my opinion, be given.

    The situation is entirely different in the case of goods whose loss entails some hardship substituted in their place; for example, when good health is impaired there is a change to ill-health; when the eye is put out, we are visited with blindness; we not only lose our speed when our leg-muscles are cut, but infirmity takes the place of speed.  But no such danger is involved in the case of the goods to which we referred a moment ago.  And why?  If I have lost a good friend, I have no false friend whom I must endure in his place; nor if I have buried a dutiful son, must I face in exchange unfilial conduct.  In the second place, this does not mean to me the taking-off of a friend or of a child; it is the mere taking-off of their bodies.  But a good can be lost in only one way, by changing into what is bad; and this is impossible according to the law of nature, because every virtue, and every work of virtue, abides uncorrupted.  

    Again, even if friends have perished, or children of approved goodness who fulfill their father's prayers for them, there is something that can fill their place.  Do you ask what this is?  It is that which had made them good in the first place, namely, virtue.  Virtue suffers no space in us to be unoccupied; it takes possession of the whole soul and removes all sense of loss.  It alone is sufficient; for the strength and beginnings of all goods exist in virtue herself.  What does it matter if running water is cut off and flows away, as long as the fountain from which it has flowed is unharmed?  You will not maintain that a man's life is more just if his children are unharmed than if they have passed away, nor yet better appointed, nor more intelligent, nor more honorable; therefore, no better, either.  The addition of friends does not make one wiser, nor does their taking away make one more foolish; therefore, not happier or more wretched, either.  As long as your virtue is unharmed, you will not feel the loss of anything that has been withdrawn from you.  You may say:  "Come now; is not a man happier when girt about with a large company of friends and children?"  Why should this be so?  For the Supreme Good is neither impaired nor increased thereby; it abides within its own limits, no matter how Fortune has conducted herself.  Whether a long old age falls to one's lot, or whether the end comes on this side of old age--the measure of the Supreme Good is unvaried, in spite of the difference in years....

    The other answer, which I promised to make to your objection, follows from this reasoning.  The wise man is not distressed by the loss of children or of friends.  For he endures their death in the same spirit in which he awaits his own.  And he fears the the one as little as he grieves for the other.  For the underlying principle of virtue is conformity; all the works of  virtue are in harmony and agreement with virtue itself.  But this harmony is lost if the soul, which ought to be uplifted, is cast down by grief or a sense of loss  It is ever a dishonor for a man to be troubled and fretted, to be numbed when there is any call for activity.  For that which is honorable is free from care and untrammeled, is unafraid, and stands girt for action.  

 

Example of the Stoic Wise Man

 

    "What," you ask, "will the wise man experience no emotion like disturbance of spirit?  Will not his features change color, his countenance be agitated, and his limbs grow cold?  And there are other things which we do, not under the influence of the will, but unconsciously and as the result of a sort of natural impulse."  I admit that this is true; but the sage will retain the firm belief that none of these things is evil, or important enough to make a healthy mind break down.  Whatever shall remain to be done virtue can do with courage and readiness.  For anyone would admit that it is a mark of folly to do in a slothful and rebellious spirit whatever one has to do, or to direct the body in one direction and the mind in another, and thus to be torn between utterly conflicting emotions.  For folly is despised precisely because of the things for which she vaunts and admires herself, and she does not do gladly even those things in which she prides herself.  But if folly fears some evil, she is burdened by it in the very moment of awaiting it, just as if it had actually come,--already suffering in apprehension whatever she fears she may suffer.  Just as in the body symptoms of latent ill-health precede the disease--there is, for example, a certain weak sluggishness, a lassitude which is not the result of any work, a trembling, and a shivering that pervades the limbs,--so the feeble spirit is shaken by its ills a long time before it is overcome by them.  It anticipates them, and totters before its time.

    But what is greater madness than to be tortured by the future and not to save your strength for the actual suffering but to invite and bring on wretchedness?  If you cannot  be rid of it, you ought at least to postpone it.  Will you not understand that no man should be tormented by the future?  The man who has been told that he will have to endure torture fifty years from now is not disturbed thereby, unless he has leaped over the intervening years, and has projected himself into the trouble that is destined to arrive a generation later.  In the same way, souls that enjoy being sick and that seize upon excuses for sorrow are saddened by events long past and effaced from the records.  Past and future are both absent; we feel neither of them.  But there can be no pain except as the result of what you feel.  Farewell.

 

    honorable:  the term here is being used synonymously with virtuous.  Likewise, when Seneca uses the term dishonorable he means vicious.

    soul:  once again he is referring to the good of the soul or virtue.

    preferred things:  he is throwing a bone here to the traditional stoic concepts of "preferable" and "rejectable" things, although his arguments in this epistle undermine these concepts completely.

 
 

 

 

IV.  Summarizing Various Perspectives on Happiness

Before you get too confused, this might be a good point to clarify all the positions that we have examine so far:

1.  Terms

  • (morally) good:  that which contributes to our happiness (morally positive)

  • (morally) bad:  that which adversely affects our happiness  (morally negative)

  • indifferent (things):  those things which neither contribute to or adversely  affect our happiness (morally neutral)

    • preferable (indifferent things):  those things which neither contribute to or adversely  affect our happiness....but worth having if they are available  (morally neutral for ancient Stoics, morally positive for middle Stoics, but potentially negative Seneca).

    • rejectable (indifferent things):  those things which neither contribute to or adversely affect our happiness....but probably should be avoided if possible (morally neutral for ancient Stoics, morally negative for middle Stoics, but potentially positive for Seneca).

2.  Summing it All Up

Aristotle

GOOD BAD
virtue and external goods  (noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, good children, numerous children, good old age, health, beauty, strength, good reputation, honor, good luck) vice and external evils (ignoble birth, few friends, bad friends, bad children, no children, bad old age, sickness, ugliness, weakness, a bad reputation, dishonor, bad luck)

 

The Early Stoics

GOOD PREFERABLE (INDIFF) REJECTABLE (INDIFF) BAD
virtue external goods external evils vice

 

Seneca

GOOD COMPLETELY INDIFFERENT BAD
virtue

everything other than virtue and vice

vice

The Stoics would have us believe that if we recognize virtue as our sole good and scorn worldly advantages as completely indifferent to our well-being, we cannot help but be happy.  Why then are so many people in this world, so miserably unhappy?

As we shall see in the next section, the Stoics maintain that it is the passions that cause us to incorrectly judge such things as sickness and poverty as bad and such things as health and wealth as good.  By investing ourselves emotionally in this that are subject to the whims of Fate, we are opening ourselves up to misery.  But the Stoics also believe that if we can just find a way to eradicate our passions, our happiness will virtually be guaranteed.