|

Platonic
Idealism [2]
The
Phaedo: The Philosopher Facing Death
One of the most interesting
philosophical texts dealing with the question of death is Plato's Phaedo, a
later dialogue describing the last hours of Socrates before his death from
hemlock. Although the dialogue probably captures, to some extent, the historical
situation of Socrates' death, you should keep in mind that the text was
written later in Plato's career and therefore the discussion on death
contained within it more likely reflects Plato's own views rather than
Socrates'.
The prologue of the dialogue is
set at Phlius a few months after Socrates death. Phaedo has been asked
by Ecrates and others to describe the manner of Socrates' death.
1. Setting
the Scene
Phaedo transports us back to
Socrates' prison cell on the evening before he is to die. Socrates'
execution has been put off for 30 days until the sacred ship from Delos
arrives in Athens. During this interval, Socrates has used the time to
continue his practice of engaging in philosophical discourse with his
disciples. Now the time of waiting is over and Socrates will be put to
death in the morning. At this crucial time, Socrates is attended to by
some of his favorite disciples, including Simmias, Cebes, and Crito (Plato,
however, is notably absent). All of them know that this will be the last
conversation that they have with their friend and mentor. Xantippe,
Socrates' wife, and their children are also present but they are promptly
dismissed so that the men can get down to some serious philosophizing.
The actual
catalyst for the discussion on death and the immortality of the soul is rather
strange: Cebes remembers a question that has been put to him for
Socrates by Evenus, the poet. He wants to know why Socrates, who is not
a poet at all, is putting the fables of Aesop into verse. Socrates'
replies that he has been admonished in his dreams to "make music"
and he takes this to mean that he should not only practice philosophy
(the sweetest kind of music) but should write verse in the popular sense as
well.
Then comes the
strange part: Socrate's asks Cebes to tell Evenus to follow him quickly---to
the grave that is. When Cebes expresses his amazement that
Socrates should say such a thing, he responds: "Is he not a
philosopher?" Socrates' position, it seems, is that a real philosopher would
recognize that although suicide is wrong, death, nonetheless, is a good thing.
After this we
get into the meat of the discussion on why the philosopher need not fear
death...
| |
|
|
| |
PHAEDO
Socrates
in Prison
I
will begin at the beginning [said Phaedo] and try to repeat the entire
conversation. You must understand that we had been previously in the
habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial
was held, and which is not far from the prison. There we remained
talking with one another until the opening of the prison doors (for they
were not opened very early), and then went in and generally passed the
day with Socrates. On the last morning the meeting was earlier than
usual; this was owing to our having heard on the previous evening that
the sacred ship had arrived from Delos, and therefore we agreed to meet
very early at the accustomed place. On our going to the prison, the
jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and bade
us wait and he would call us. "For the Eleven," he said,
"are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving
orders that he is to die to-day." He soon returned and said that we
might come in.
On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe,
whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When
she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: "O Socrates,
this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends,
or they with you." Socrates turned to Crito and said: "Crito,
let someone take her home." Some of Crito's people accordingly led
her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone,
Socrates, sitting up on the couch, began to bend and rub his leg,
saying, as he rubbed: "How singular is the thing called pleasure,
and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the
opposite of it; for they never come to a man together, and yet he who
pursues either of them is generally compelled to take the other. They
are two, and yet they grow together out of one head or stem; and I
cannot help thinking that if Aesop had noticed them, he would have made
a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and when he could
not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when
one comes the other follows, as I find in my own case pleasure comes
following after the pain in my leg, which was caused by the chain."
Upon this Cebes said: I am very glad indeed, Socrates, that you
mentioned the name of Aesop. For that reminds me of a question which has
been asked by others, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday
by Evenus the poet, and as he will be sure to ask again, you may as well
tell me what I should say to him, if you would like him to have an
answer. He wanted to know why you who never before wrote a line of
poetry, now that you are in prison are putting Aesop into verse, and
also composing that hymn in honor of Apollo.
Tell him, Cebes, he replied, that I had no idea of rivaling him or his
poems; which is the truth, for I knew that I could not do that. But I
wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about
certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in
dreams "that I should make music." The same dream came to me
sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the
same or nearly the same words: Make and cultivate music, said the dream.
And thus far I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and
encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has always been the
pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was
bidding me to do what I was already doing, in the same way that the
competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is
already running. But I was not certain of this, as the dream might have
meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence
of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that I should
be safer if I satisfied the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream,
composed a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in
honor of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if
he is really to be a poet or maker, should not only put words together
but make stories, and as I have no invention, I took some fables of Esop,
which I had ready at hand and knew, and turned them into verse.
Tell
Evenus this, and bid him be of good cheer; that I would have him come
after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely
to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.
Death
as a Good and The Prohibition Against Suicide
Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent
companion of his, I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never
take your advice unless he is obliged.
Why, said Socrates, -- is not Evenus a philosopher?
I think that he is, said Simmias.
Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to
die, though he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be
right.
Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the
ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.
Why do you say, inquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own
life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are acquainted
with Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
I never understood him, Socrates.
My words, too, are only an echo; but I am very willing to say what I
have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, I ought to be
thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to
make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting
of the sun?
Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be right? as I have
certainly heard Philolaus affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes:
and there are others who say the same, although none of them has ever
made me understand him.
But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will
understand. I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil
may be accidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for may not
death, too, be better than life in some cases?), and why, when a man is
better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait
for the hand of another.
By Jupiter! yes, indeed, said Cebes, laughing, and speaking in his
native Doric.
I admit the appearance of inconsistency, replied Socrates, but there may
not be any real inconsistency after all in this.
There is a doctrine uttered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no
right to open the door of his prison and run away; this is a great
mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I, too, believe that the
gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs. Do you
not agree?
Yes, I agree to that, said Cebes.
And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example took
the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no
intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with
him, and would you not punish him if you could?
Certainly, replied Cebes.
Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take
his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.
Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. And yet how
can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that
God is our guardian and we his possessions, with that willingness to die
which we were attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men
should be willing to leave this service in which they are ruled by the
gods who are the best of rulers is not reasonable, for surely no wise
man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself
than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think this -- he may argue
that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his
duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and
that there is no sense in his running away. But the wise man will want
to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is
the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man
should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.
The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he,
turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not to be
convinced all in a moment, nor by every argument.
Socrates
Attitude Towards His Own Death
And in this case, added Simmias, his objection does appear to me to have
some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to
fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I
rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are
too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods who, as you
acknowledge, are our good rulers.
Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in that. And this indictment you
think that I ought to answer as if I were in court?
That is what we should like, said Simmias.
Then I must try to make a better impression upon you than I did when
defending myself before the judges. For I am quite ready to acknowledge,
Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not
persuaded that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of this I
am as certain as I can be of anything of the sort) and to men departed
(though I am not so certain of this), who are better than those whom I
leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I
have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and,
as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the
evil.
But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said
Simmias. Will you not communicate them to us? -- the benefit is one in
which we too may hope to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing
us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.
I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what
Crito wants; he was going to say something to me.
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito: the attendant who is to give you the
poison has been telling me that you are not to talk much, and he wants
me to let you know this; for that by talking heat is increased, and this
interferes with the action of the poison; those who excite themselves
are sometimes obliged to drink the poison two or three times.
Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give
the poison two or three times, if necessary; that is all.
I was almost certain that you would say that, replied Crito; but I was
obliged to satisfy him.
Never mind him, he said. |
59c-70c |
| |
|
|
2. The
Philosopher's Attitude Towards Death
Next comes the main these of
the dialogue: not only should the philosopher not fear death, he should
actually welcome it. For death is nothing more than the separation of
body a soul. The philosopher would certainly welcome such a separation
from his body, since the body interferes with his quest for the Truth:
| |
|
|
| |
The
Philosopher Embraces Death
And now I will make answer to you, O my judges, and show that he who
has lived as a true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he
is about to die, and that after death he may hope to receive the
greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and
Cebes, I will endeavor to explain. For I deem that the true disciple
of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not
perceive that he is ever pursuing death and dying; and if this is
true, why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he
repine at the arrival of that which he has been always pursuing and
desiring?
Simmias laughed and said: Though not in a laughing humor, I swear that
I cannot help laughing when I think what the wicked world will say
when they hear this. They will say that this is very true, and our
people at home will agree with them in saying that the life which
philosophers desire is truly death, and that they have found them out
to be deserving of the death which they desire.
And they are right, Simmias, in saying this, with the exception of the
words "They have found them out"; for they have not found
out what is the nature of this death which the true philosopher
desires, or how he deserves or desires death. But let us leave them
and have a word with ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a
thing as death?
To be sure, replied Simmias.
And is this anything but the separation of soul and body? And being
dead is the attainment of this separation; when the soul exists in
herself, and is parted from the body and the body is parted from the
soul -- that is death?
Exactly: that and nothing else, he replied.
And what do you say of another question, my friend, about which I
should like to have your opinion, and the answer to which will
probably throw light on our present inquiry: Do you think that the
philosopher ought to care about the pleasures -- if they are to be
called pleasures -- of eating and drinking?
Certainly not, answered Simmias.
And what do you say of the pleasures of love -- should he care about
them?
By no means.
And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body -- for
example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other
adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not
rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?
I should say the true philosopher would despise them.
Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not
with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to be quit of the body
and turn to the soul.
That is true.
In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be
observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the body.
That is true.
Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that a life
which has no bodily pleasures and no part in them is not worth having;
but that he who thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as though
he were dead.
That is quite true.
Death
and Knowledge
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? -- is
the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper?
I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not,
as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if
even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the
other senses? -- for you will allow that they are the best of them?
Certainly, he replied.
Then when does the soul attain truth? -- for in attempting to consider
anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.
Yes, that is true.
Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
Yes.
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of
these things trouble her -- neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any
pleasure -- when she has as little as possible to do with the body,
and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after being?
That is true.
And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; his soul runs away
from the body and desires to be alone and by herself?
That is true.
Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an
absolute justice?
Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
Of course.
But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? (and I speak
not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and
strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything). Has the
reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?
or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their
several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as
to have the most exact conception of the essence of that which he
considers?
Certainly.
And he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who
goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act
of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense
in the company of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her
clearness penetrates into the very fight of truth in each; he has got
rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the whole body, which
he conceives of only as a disturbing element, hindering the soul from
the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her -- is not this
the sort of man who, if ever man did, is likely to attain the
knowledge of existence?
There is admirable truth in that, Socrates, replied Simmias.
And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a
reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as
these: We have found, they will say, a path of speculation which seems
to bring us and the argument to the conclusion that while we are in
the body, and while the soul is mingled with this mass of evil, our
desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the
body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere
requirement of food; and also is liable to diseases which overtake and
impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us so full of
loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of
folly, prevents our ever having, as people say, so much as a thought.
For whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the
body and the lusts of the body? For wars are occasioned by the love of
money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of
the body; and in consequence of all these things the time which ought
to be given to philosophy is lost.
Moreover, if there is time and an
inclination toward philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and
confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from
seeing the truth: and all experience shows that if we would have pure
knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in
herself must behold all things in themselves: then I suppose that we
shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are
lovers, and that is wisdom, not while we live, but after death, as the
argument shows; for if while in company with the body the soul cannot
have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow -- either
knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death.
For then, and not till then, the soul will be in herself alone and
without the body. In this present life, I reckon that we make the
nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible concern
or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature,
but remain pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release
us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we
shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of
ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of
truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure. These are
the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot
help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in
that?
Certainly, Socrates.
Death
As Purification
But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going
whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the
chief concern of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour
of departure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart,
and not I only, but every man who believes that he has his mind
purified.
Certainly, replied Simmias.
And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body,
as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting
herself into herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling
in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as
she can; the release of the soul from the chains of the body?
Very true, he said.
And what is that which is termed death, but this very separation and
release of the soul from the body?
To be sure, he said.
And the true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to
release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from
the body their especial study?
That is true.
And as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous
contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state
of death, and yet repining when death comes.
Certainly.
Then, Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, to
them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the matter in
this way: how inconsistent of them to have been always enemies of the
body, and wanting to have the soul alone, and when this is granted to
them, to be trembling and repining; instead of rejoicing at their
departing to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain
that which in life they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the same
time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been
willing to go to the world below in the hope of seeing there an
earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he
who is a true lover of wisdom, and is persuaded in like manner that
only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at
death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, my friend, if he
be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there
only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this
be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were to fear
death.
He would, indeed, replied Simmias....
Cebes'
Objection
Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you
say. But in what relates to the soul, men are apt to be incredulous;
they fear that when she leaves the body her place may be nowhere, and
that on the very day of death she may be destroyed and perish --
immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth like smoke or
air and vanishing away into nothingness. For if she could only hold
together and be herself after she was released from the evils of the
body, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say
is true. But much persuasion and many arguments are required in order
to prove that when the man is dead the soul yet exists, and has any
force of intelligence.
True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we talk a little
of the probabilities of these things?
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should gready like to know your opinion
about them.
I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he
were one of my old enemies, the comic poets, could accuse me of idle
talking about matters in which I have no concern. Let us, then, if you
please, proceed with the inquiry. |
|
| |
|
|
Socrates'
confidence in the face of death may be comforting to his friends, but Cebes,
for one, still has his doubts. After all, what if the soul upon leaving the body should
vanish like smoke? How can Socrates be certain that the soul continues
to exist even after the body dies?
3. Doctrines Concerning
Body and Soul
Although Plato
develops numerous arguments in the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul,
many of these arguments are rather complicated and are not always convincing
to a modern reader. Instead of examining Plato more philosophical
arguments arguments, then, we will skip his "religious
reflections". These are based upon Socrates' beliefs in the body as
the prison of the soul---a prison that human beings are forced to inhabit
until they have purified themselves and their souls are capable of residing
in the spiritual realm:
| |
|
|
| |
Body
and Soul
...Observe, that after a man is dead, the body, which is
the visible part of man, and has a visible framework, which is called a
corpse, and which would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and
dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a
good while, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the
season of the year favorable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as
is the custom in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages;
and even in decay, still there are some portions, such as the bones and
ligaments, which are practically indestructible. You allow that?
Yes.
And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to
the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on
her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also
soon to go -- that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin,
is blown away and perishes immediately on quitting the body as the many
say? That can never be, dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is that
the soul which is pure at departing draws after her no bodily taint,
having never voluntarily had connection with the body, which she is ever
avoiding, herself gathered into herself (for such abstraction has been
the study of her life). And what does this mean but that she has been a
true disciple of philosophy and has practised how to die easily? And is
not philosophy the practice of death?
Certainly.
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world to
the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she lives in
bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and
wild passions and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say
of the initiated, in company with the gods. Is not this true, Cebes?
Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.
The
"Pollution" of Souls
But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her
departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is
in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures
of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a
bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste and use for the
purposes of his lusts -- the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear
and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark
and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy -- do you suppose
that such a soul as this will depart pure and unalloyed?
That is impossible, he replied.
She is engrossed by the corporeal, which the continual association and
constant care of the body have made natural to her.
Very true.
And this, my friend, may be conceived to be that heavy, weighty, earthy
element of sight by which such a soul is depressed and dragged down
again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and
of the world below -- prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the
neighborhood of which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly
apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with
sight and therefore visible.
That is very likely, Socrates.
Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the
good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in
payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they
continue to wander until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and
they are imprisoned in another body. And they may be supposed to be
fixed in the same natures which they had in their former life.
What natures do you mean, Socrates?
I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness,
and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass
into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?
I think that exceedingly probable.
And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and
violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites; whither else
can we suppose them to go?
Yes, said Cebes; that is doubtless the place of natures such as theirs.
And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places
answering to their several natures and propensities?
There is not, he said.
Even among them some are happier than others; and the happiest both in
themselves and their place of abode are those who have practised the
civil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and
are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind.
Why are they the happiest?
Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle, social nature
which is like their own, such as that of bees or ants, or even back
again into the form of man, and just and moderate men spring from them.
That is not impossible.
Philosophy
as Purification of the Soul
But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is entirely pure
at departing, is alone permitted to reach the gods. And this is the
reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain
from all fleshly lusts, and endure and refuse to give themselves up to
them -- not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families,
like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers
of power and honor, because they dread the dishonor or disgrace of evil
deeds.
No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.
No, indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have a care of their
souls, and do not merely live in the fashions of the body, say farewell
to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when
philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel
that they ought not to resist her influence, and to her they incline,
and whither she leads they follow her.
What do you mean, Socrates?
The
Body as Prison of the Soul
I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that
their souls, when philosophy receives them, are simply fastened and
glued to their bodies: the soul is only able to view existence through
the bars of a prison, and not in her own nature; she is wallowing in the
mire of all ignorance; and philosophy, seeing the terrible nature of her
confinement, and that the captive through desire is led to conspire in
her own captivity (for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was
the original state of the soul, and that when she was in this state
philosophy received and gently counseled her, and wanted to release her,
pointing out to her that the eye is full of deceit, and also the ear and
other senses, and persuading her to retire from them in all but the
necessary use of them and to be gathered up and collected into herself,
and to trust only to herself and her own intuitions of absolute
existence, and mistrust that which comes to her through others and is
subject to vicissitude) -- philosophy shows her that this is visible and
tangible, but that what she sees in her own nature is intellectual and
invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought
not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures
and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that
when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires he suffers from
them, not the sort of evil which might be anticipated -- as, for
example, the loss of his health or property, which he has sacrificed to
his lusts -- but he has suffered an evil greater far, which is the
greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.
And what is that, Socrates? said Cebes.
Why, this: When the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul is most
intense, all of us naturally suppose that the object of this intense
feeling is then plainest and truest: but this is not the case.
Very true.
And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body.
How is that?
Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and
rivets the soul to the body, and engrosses her and makes her believe
that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing
with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the
same habits and ways, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure
to the world below, but is always saturated with the body; so that she
soon sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has
therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.
That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.
And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are
temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.
Certainly not.
Certainly not! For not in that way does the soul of a philosopher
reason; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when
released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures
and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of
unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will make herself a calm of
passion and follow Reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and
divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment.
Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go
to her own kindred and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias
and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these
pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown
away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing. |
|
| |
|
|
4.
Socrates' Death Scene
The dialogue
ends with the famous death scene of Socrates. Of course, the great man
is not at all concerned about what his friends do with his body: he is
not his body after all:
| |
|
|
| |
When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us,
Socrates -- anything to say about your children, or any other matter in
which we can serve you?
Nothing particular, he said: only, as I have always told you, I would
have you look to yourselves; that is a service which you may always be
doing to me and mine as well as to yourselves. And you need not make
professions; for if you take no thought for yourselves, and walk not
according to the precepts which I have given you, not now for the first
time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail.
We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would you have us bury
you?
In any way that you like; only you must get hold of me, and take care
that I do not walk away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a
smile: I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have
been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other
Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body -- and he asks, How shall he
bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavor to show
that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys
of the blessed -- these words of mine, with which I comforted you and
myself, have had, I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want
you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me at the trial: but
let the promise be of another sort; for he was my surety to the judges
that I would remain, but you must be my surety to him that I shall not
remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my
death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I
would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we
lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for
false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul
with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are
burying my body only, and do with that as is usual, and as you think
best.
When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into the bath chamber
with Crito, who bade us wait; and we waited, talking and thinking of the
subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was
like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass
the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his
children were brought to him -- (he had two young sons and an elder
one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and
gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; and he then
dismissed them and returned to us.
Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed
while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after
his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of
the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying: To you, Socrates, whom I
know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to
this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage
and swear at me when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink
the poison -- indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for
others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare
you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be; you know my
errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.
Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do
as you bid. Then, turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since
I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times
he would talk to me, and was as good as could be to me, and now see how
generously he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito; let the
cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant
prepare some.
Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hilltops, and many a one has
taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him,
he has eaten and drunk, and indulged in sensual delights; do not hasten
then, there is still time.
Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in doing
thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in
not doing thus, for I do not think that I should gain anything by
drinking the poison a little later; I should be sparing and saving a
life which is already gone: I could only laugh at myself for this.
Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.
Crito, when he heard this, made a sign to the servant, and the servant
went in, and remained for some time, and then returned with the jailer
carrying a cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are
experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to
proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs
are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same
time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest
manner, without the least fear or change of color or feature, looking at
the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup
and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any
god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so
much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: yet I may and must pray
to the gods to prosper my journey from this to that other world -- may
this, then, which is my prayer, be granted to me. Then holding the cup
to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And
hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we
saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could
no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing
fast; so that I covered my face and wept over myself, for certainly I
was not weeping over him, but at the thought of my own calamity in
having lost such a companion. Nor was I the first, for Crito, when he
found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away,
and I followed; and at that moment. Apollodorus, who had been weeping
all the time, broke out in a loud cry which made cowards of us all.
Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? he
said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend
in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet,
then, and have patience.
When we heard that, we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he
walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay
on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the
poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he
pressed his foot hard and asked him if he could feel; and he said, no;
and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was
cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison
reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold
about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself
up, and said (they were his last words) -- he said: Crito, I owe a cock
to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid,
said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this
question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the
attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes
and mouth.
Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the
wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known. |
|
| |
|
|

Table
of Contents | Sophia Project
| Department of
Philosophy
© 2002, M. Russo
For more information contact: mrusso@molloy.edu
|